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HOW HIGH IS TOO HIGH?: REFLECTIONS ON
THE SOURCES AND MEANING OF
CLAIM CONSTRUCTION REVERSAL RATES
AT THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
Richard S. Gruner*
Some commentators believe that the Federal Circuit's reversal rates for
claim construction cases indicate that the court's standards for claim
construction are too vague and give too little guidance to lower courts
on how to conduct claim construction. This Article argues that these
interpretations of claim construction reversal rates are incorrect and
that these rates are high because the cases that reach the Federal
Circuit are outliers with particularly uncertain claims that are
unusually likely to be interpreted differently by different courts. By
contrast, the cases that do not reach the Federal Circuit involve claims
that are clearer and that litigants tend to evaluate similarly in
estimating similar case values and settling 88% offiled patent cases.
This Article reviews empirical research on Federal Circuit claim
construction rates and lower court reversals. Then it discusses the
probable impacts of case filtering on Federal Circuit appeals and
reversals. The Article then explains why analysis of the Federal
Circuit's claim construction standards should focus on case settlement
rates rather than reversal rates.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Recent analysts have concluded that the claim construction
reversal rates of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit are too
high.' Reported reversal rates of about 33% of cases based on
disputed lower courts' claim constructions 2  Suggest to some
commentators that the Federal Circuit's standards for claim
construction are too vague, leading to uncertainty about proper
approaches to claim construction on the part of lower courts (and
others such as patent attorneys who must predict lower court results
to give patent scope and infringement advice to clients). The result,
these analysts argue, is harmful for patent holders, potential
infringers, and patent litigation processes. Patent holders suffer due
1. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Lefstin, Claim Construction, Appeal, and the Predictability of
Interpretive Regimes, 61 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1033, 1037 (2007) (noting that "the notion that the
reversal rate [in claim construction cases] is 'too high' has become firmly ingrained in the minds
of commentators, practitioners, and judges alike, and is typically the first premise invoked in
support of arguments to overhaul the current system of adjudicating patent infringement disputes"
(footnote omitted)); Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent
Cases?, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 27 (2001) (describing claim construction reversal rates as
"high" and "problematic"); David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study of
Claim Construction Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REv. 223, 225 (2008)
(describing Federal Circuit claim construction reversals in patent cases as occurring at an
"alarming rate").
While commentators have frequently expressed concern about the size of claim
construction reversal rates, some have pointed out (as is argued later in this Article) that these
rates may be no higher than reversal rates in other areas of the law. See Lefstin, supra, at 1038-
39; Schwartz, supra, at 258-59 n.161.
2. See Moore, supra note 1, at 11 (noting that in cases resolved from 1995 to 1999,
"[d]istrict court judges decided at least one claim construction issue wrong in 33% of all the
appealed patent cases."); Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years Later: Is Claim
Construction More Predictable?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 231, 239 (2005) (finding that in
37.5% of cases leading to Federal Circuit reviews between April 23, 1996-the date of the
Supreme Court's Markman decision-and the end of 2003, district courts wrongly construed at
least a single claim term); Schwartz, supra note 1, at 248 (finding that Federal Circuit reversals of
lower court claim constructions from 1996 to 2007 indicate that the Federal Circuit felt that
32.5% of the patent claims at issue were "wrongly" construed by the lower courts; 38.2% of cases
had at least one term differently construed by the district and Federal Circuit courts).
3. The potential adverse implications of high claim construction reversal rates were
summarized by then Professor, now Federal Circuit Judge, Kimberly A. Moore as follows:
The high reversal rate on claim construction is problematic. It creates uncertainty in
patent cases and in patent claim scope analysis until the Federal Circuit review is
complete. This hinders ex ante attempts to ascertain permissible behavior and ex post
attempts to litigate infringement. Claim construction is critical to both infringement
and validity determinations. Greater unpredictability exists for litigants and
competitors if claim construction is not certain or definite until it is appealed to the
Federal Circuit. In addition to the obvious effects on the cases that are reversed, which
could include lengthy and expensive retrials, the high percentage of reversals increases
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to uncertainty about the enforceable scope of patents and associated
reductions in patent value. Potential infringers suffer from
unnecessary avoidance of some noninfringing activities. Judicial
processes suffer because of wasted court and litigant actions as claim
constructions are adopted and relied upon in trials and then
unexpectedly reversed in later appeals leading to the need for
duplicative litigation.
This Article argues that these are mistaken interpretations of
measured reversal rates in Federal Circuit claim construction
appeals. Cases reviewed and frequently reversed by the Federal
Circuit are argued here to be outliers, selectively filtered by the case
settlement processes that dominate patent litigation to ensure that
only the most uncertain claim construction cases reach the Federal
Circuit. As they review cases with high claim construction
uncertainty, it is hardly surprising that district courts and Federal
Circuit judges see the intensely factual and highly technical issues
surrounding the meaning and construction of patent claims
differently.
A Federal Circuit appeal and review follows a series of
opportunities and failures of the parties to settle the applicable patent
litigation despite ever-increasing discovery and learning of the
parties about the nature and the value of the case as it has proceeded.
This suggests that a case reaches the Federal Circuit because the
parties still differ on some key factual or legal aspects of the case.
From their respective viewpoints based on different factual or legal
characterizations, the parties have generally assigned significantly
different case values to the litigation and are accordingly unable to
reach similar settlement terms. Under these conditions of uncertainty
and materially different findings deemed plausible by the respective
parties, coupled with the ability of litigants to take clear (or at least
similarly perceived) cases out of the adjudicatory system through
settlements, the surprising question is not why the Federal Circuit
claim construction reversal rates are so high, but rather why these
rates are not even higher.
litigation overall. Because of the increased uncertainty attending de novo review of
claim construction, parties are less capable of predicting their chances of winning and
therefore less likely to settle.
Moore, supra note 1, at 27-28.
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Furthermore, given the ability and tendency of litigants to shift
their case selection practices and choose to press cases to the Federal
Circuit based on whatever range of cases are perceived to be
uncertain under then-prevailing standards of patent law or judicial
preferences, cases appealed to the Federal Circuit may always have
types of large uncertainties that will ensure high reversal rates. This
will be true regardless of the care taken by lower courts in resolving
claim constructions and the possibility that district court claim
constructions will improve with growing experience in claims
construction analyses. At whatever skill or accuracy level district
courts conduct their analyses, some of their analyses will leave
behind material uncertainties. This component of cases will tend to
be the ones appealed to the Federal Circuit, with the result that
reversal rates will stay high even as patent standards, district court
skills, and the clarity of lower court claim constructions improve. In
short, so long as litigants cherry-pick only those uncertain cases
involving difficult or peculiarly indeterminate claim construction
analyses to the Federal Circuit reversal rates will be substantial
through no fault or responsibility of the district courts.
Litigants tend to ensure that simple cases are filtered out through
settlement processes. As a result, the cases brought forward for
appeals involve a large fraction of cases that have material factual
and legal issues still outstanding after trials and that provide
substantial support for different findings from those reached by the
district courts in the same cases. This means that the cases presented
to the Federal Circuit are frequently at tipping points and the stage is
set in many such cases for different results in the Federal Circuit.
The fact that such different results are achieved in many claim
construction cases-particularly under the de novo review standard
applied to claim constructions by the Federal Circuit-is hardly
surprising.
Conversely, the fact that the claim construction guidance of the
Federal Circuit supports case settlements in about 88% of filed patent
cases 4 suggests that there is presently sufficient certainty in the
operative claim construction system. The uncertainty and high
reversal rates seen in Federal Circuit results are not fairly
4. See UNIV. OF HOUSTON LAW CTR., DISTRICT COURT DISPOSITION MODES FOR PATENT
CASES-FY 2008, http://www.patstats.org/2008fy Patent-Case DispositionModes.doc (2009)
(looking at all patent cases in 2008).
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characteristic of the overall case resolution results achieved by patent
standards governing legal analyses and case outcomes. Rather than
being impeded by unmanageable uncertainty in case analyses, most
patent litigants considering settlements seem to find their own ways
to reach joint-and presumably roughly similar-analyses of case
features, to make similar estimates of case value based on their
respective interpretations of case features, and to agree on settlement
terms accordingly. Settlements will tend to result where the litigants'
estimates of case values (based on predicted liability results) differ
by no more than the projected litigation costs likely to be incurred if
litigation continues, such that the litigants are better off ignoring
their differences, agreeing on settlement terms reflecting a case value
somewhere between their respective estimates, and avoiding the
litigation costs that would otherwise follow.
The generally parallel case views of parties to settlements will
typically include parallel views about important case details such as
the material features of claim constructions. This is particularly true
of claim constructions because of their central role in determining
case value. Claim constructions and resulting claim scope
evaluations have a threshold analytic importance in determining the
range of exclusivity associated with a patent and, hence, the range of
patent infringement and associated damages liability and injunctive
relief at issue in particular cases. Given this fundamental role of
claim constructions in determining patent infringement liability, it is
hard to imagine how opposing litigants relying on significantly
different claim constructions could nonetheless see similar liability
potential in particular cases and come to similar estimates of case
values and acceptable settlement terms. It seems far more likely that
settlement agreements reflect some substantial similarity in the claim
construction predictions of the opposing litigants should their cases
be fully litigated, leading to further parallel conclusions of the parties
about likely liability outcomes, case values, and jointly acceptable
settlement terms.
Absent such parallel understandings of their cases leading to
similar (although not precisely identical) estimates of case value,
patent litigants would be unlikely to agree to terminate cases through
settlements. Hence, the cases where settlements are found are likely
those where roughly similar projections of court outcomes (or at least
the spectrum of probable outcomes) are held by the parties to
Spring 2010] 987
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particular settlements. Federal Circuit standards for claim
construction-coupled with private fact finding as patent
enforcement disputes develop-provide the common analytic
frameworks and shared factual underpinnings in particular patent
cases that tend to cause many disputants to adopt similar predictions
about the claim constructions that courts are likely to apply if the
cases are fully litigated. This, in turn, encourages the disputants to
embrace similar views of projected patent enforcement liability
leading to settlement offers and agreements.
The adequacy of present claim construction standards to support
these sorts of settlement processes should be the measure of success
of Federal Circuit standards, with actual Federal Circuit reviews of
those cases not settled seen as a secondary feature involving a "failed
process" backup to the settlement processes that dominate patent
litigation. Under this view, Federal Circuit standards are succeeding
because patent litigants are finding their own ways to press and
resolve filed patent cases (and to resolve further prelitigation
disputes that do not even raise sufficient uncertainty to justify the
filing of a patent case).
This Article begins with a quick review of empirical research on
Federal Circuit claim construction results and lower court reversals.
This includes a brief summary of prior commentators' interpretations
of these results, with an emphasis on why these analysts have seen
existing reversal rates as problematic.
Next, the Article describes the selection processes that ensure
appealed cases presenting claim construction issues tend to include
large numbers of cases in which claim constructions are both
material and indeterminate-that is, cases in which there are several
plausible claim interpretations, each with substantial support in the
case record, but each leading to a very different case result. This is
the type of case that selection processes feed to the Federal Circuit,
leading to reversal rates that say little about claims construction
standards and a lot about litigation filtering and appellate caseload
atypicality.
Following this discussion of the probable impacts of case
filtering on Federal Circuit appeals and claim construction reversals,
the Article considers the size of Federal Circuit claim construction
reversal rates predicted by case selection theory, with attention to
whether these rates are abnormally high, about normal, or even
988
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surprisingly low given the institutional character of the Federal
Circuit court and the highly filtered nature of the cases that it
considers. This analysis extends to Federal Circuit appeals models of
litigation processes and litigation success rates that analyze trials as
instances of failed settlement processes. This analysis treats a Federal
Circuit appeal as a consequence of a failure to settle a patent case
following a trial result. The analysis in this section evaluates whether
the claim construction reversal rates observed in the Federal Circuit
are consistent with the rates predicted by this model.
Finally, the Article assesses the reasons why evaluations of the
merit and success of the Federal Circuit's claim construction
standards should focus on case settlement rates, not reversal rates.
This type of evaluation of claim construction processes has the
advantage of measuring how the Federal Circuit's claim construction
guidance is impacting the great bulk of patent case resolutions. This
stands in contrast to evaluations emphasizing reversal rates, which
focus on only a small number of appealed patent cases-a group of
cases that, due to selection effects, are highly likely to be atypical of
patent litigation generally.
II. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION PROCESSES AND
MEASURED REVERSAL RATES
A. The Claim Construction Task
Claim construction involves the analysis of patent claim
language' to give meaning to ambiguous terms.' The objective is to
determine the scope of patent protection described by the claims.
Claims language is required to be interpreted with the perspective
and understanding of terms that would be held by a person of
average skill in the technological art (a PHOSITA) in the field of the
invention described in the claims. Despite this context-specific, field-
situated version of meaning that must be used to determine claims
scope, the task of interpreting patent claims is seen by the Supreme
Court as involving an unusual form of fact finding. Patent claim
interpretation is viewed as a variety of legal document interpretation,
5. Patent claims are numbered sentences listed at the end of a patent that describe the
invention for which protection is "claimed" under the patent and that define the scope of the
patentee's right to exclude others. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
6. See, e.g., Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
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a close cousin to document interpretation that is undertaken with
some regularity by federal courts in other legal contexts such as real
property deed interpretation. Largely because of their experience in
interpreting legal documents in other contexts, federal courts are seen
by the Supreme Court as being institutionally more competent than
juries to interpret patent claim terms. Consequently, in the absence of
congressional direction to the contrary, the Supreme Court has held
that federal courts rather than juries are solely responsible for
determining the meaning of patent claims terms in litigation.'
Federal district courts undertake claim construction as a step in
patent litigation to produce an interpretation and description of patent
boundaries that can be used by fact finders in determining whether
the conduct of an asserted patent infringer involves the invention
described and limited by a particular patent. Claim construction is
also necessary as patent attorneys analyze patents and give opinion
letters as to whether contemplated or actual conduct of clients is
likely to infringe particular patents.
In conducting claim construction analyses, federal district courts
must look first to sources of meaning in the patent documents at
issue. In Phillips v. A WH Corp.' the Federal Circuit provided
guidance to district courts on the sources that should be considered in
claim construction.' The court indicated that the meaning of claim
language should be determined primarily from intrinsic evidence,
including the claim language at issue, other claims in the patent, the
additional content of the specification portion of the patent, and the
accumulated correspondence between the patent applicant and the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office recorded in the "prosecution
history" file for the patent. 10 The court also indicated that extrinsic
evidence-that is, evidence "external to the patent and prosecution
history, including expert and inventor testimony, dictionaries, and
learned treatises""-should be considered in giving meaning to
terms in claim construction, but that extrinsic evidence is "less
7. Id. at 391.
8. 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).
9. Id. at 1316.
10. Id at 1316-17.
11. Id. at 1317 (quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, 52 F.3d 967, 980 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (en banc)).
990
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significant than the intrinsic record in determining the legally
operative meaning of claim language." 12
B. Judicial Challenges in Claim Construction
This Article does not attempt to summarize the extensive
literature on the difficulties of patent claim construction. This
literature has emphasized several reasons why nontechnically trained
district courts face unusual challenges in attempting to give meaning
to highly technical terms in patents describing inventions at the
leading edge of advancing fields of science and engineering where
even the most sophisticated specialists in these fields may have
difficulties in keeping up. Two of the most important sources of
problems are the lack of technical backgrounds of most federal
district courts and the lack of sufficiently numerous patent cases for
district courts to gain substantial experience with claim construction.
Professor Arti K. Rai described the knowledge gap that makes
patent claim construction considerably more challenging than other
types of documentary interpretation undertaken by district courts as
follows:
[P]atent scope is determined by construing the claims listed
in the patent text. Many texts with which judges must deal,
particularly statutory texts, are directed at the ordinary
speaker of English. All judges are presumably ordinary
speakers of English and thus are qualified to interpret these
texts according to their ordinary meaning. By contrast,
under long-established patent case law, patent claims are
not directed at the ordinary speaker of English; rather, they
are directed at the [person of average skill in the
technological art (PHOSITA)]. Claim construction
therefore requires a determination of what the language of
the patent claims would have meant to the PHOSITA at the
time the invention was made. Because the typical judge is
not likely to be a person of ordinary skill in the relevant
scientific or technological art, she is not likely to be
endowed with the appropriate technical knowledge. As a
consequence, even after examining a claim term in light of
12. Id. at 1317 (quoting C.R. Bard, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 388 F.3d 858, 862 (Fed. Cir.
2004)); see also Astrazeneca AB v. Mutual Pharm. Co., 384 F.3d 1333, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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the accompanying specification (or, more generally, in light
of any of the applicable canons of claim construction) she
might still find the term difficult to understand. Indeed, to
the extent that the judge assumes that she knows the
meaning of a particular term, it may be that she is making
incorrect assumptions about how one skilled in the art
would interpret the language. "
Trial court judges of general background and jurisdiction also
have limited opportunities to build up experience and specialized
skills in conducting patent claim reviews. The barriers to gaining
experience in this area were summarized in 2001 by then Professor,
now Federal Circuit Judge Kimberly A. Moore:
[G]enerally [district court judges] do not adjudicate enough
patent cases to develop expertise with the law and certainly
not with the technology which changes from case to case.
There are 646 active district court judges and more than 200
senior district court judges. Approximately 2200 patent
cases are filed each year. These figures indicate that district
court judges are not seeing very many patent cases each
year. In fact, substantive involvement by district court
judges in patent cases is far less than these numbers suggest
because the majority of patent cases are resolved via
settlement or prior to any significant court involvement.
Only 5% of the patent cases filed each year go to trial
(about 100 of the 2200 patent cases). While district court
judges may have more exposure to patent cases than jurors,
their exposure to the technology and legal doctrines that
arise in patent cases is very limited. In light of these
numbers, it seems unlikely that district court judges will
have sufficient exposure to patent cases or sufficient
incentive in light of the de novo review to improve at
construing patent claim terms. 14
More recently, using data on more recent patent cases, Moore
noted that "[m]y data show that the district courts resolve 2800
patent cases each year, but only 3% of these reach trial." " Hence, the
13. Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent
System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 1035, 1046-47 (2003) (footnotes omitted).
14. Moore, supra note 1, at 30-31 (footnotes omitted).
15. Kimberly A. Moore, Populism and Patents, 82 N.Y.U. L. REv. 69, 84 (2007).
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great bulk of experience with claim constructions related to resolving
patent disputes is acquired by patent litigation counsel in the course
of litigation preparation and settlement discussions, rather than by
district courts who rarely hear patent cases.
Thus, district court judges who, according to the Supreme
Court's Markman ruling,'" have the primary institutional
responsibility for resolving claim construction issues and for
reducing claim construction uncertainty in trial proceedings,
generally do not have the technical backgrounds that might help
them in these difficult tasks. Nor do they have many opportunities to
acquire sufficient claim construction experience to materially
improve their claim construction skills. And, as is explained more
fully below, the claim construction issues these judges resolve are
frequently heavy in uncertainties, the simpler claim construction
issues having often been resolved through case settlements. " It is not
surprising that a substantial fraction of trial court findings regarding
claim constructions diverge from the reasoning of ordinary
specialists in the relevant technologies and are therefore subject to
successful challenges on appeal. "
In light of the institutional weaknesses of district courts in this
context, it is perhaps fortunate that trial court judges do not perform
the claim construction analyses that determine most patent case
outcomes. As noted by Moore, most filed patent cases do not
proceed as far as trial but instead are settled. 1 These settlements are
products of claim construction and patent infringement analyses by
private litigants. Their settlements suggest that the litigants have
reached sufficiently similar results in their claim constructions and
infringement analyses to support overlapping evaluations of case
value, or at least evaluations that are close enough to overlap to
produce agreements on settlement terms. 20 In these private analyses,
16. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 391 (1996). The Supreme Court
held in Markman that judges, not juries, are responsible for construing patent claims. Id.
17. Infra Part IV.
18. See infra Part IV.C.
19. Moore, supra note 1, at 30.
20. Parties whose estimates of case value are similar, but not overlapping, will still tend to
settle cases if the differences in their estimates are no greater than the sum of their projected
litigation costs for the remainder of the litigation. Parties will tend to settle in these cases as a
means to avoid litigation costs that are unlikely to achieve a net benefit to the parties. See George
L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4
(1984).
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the relevant lawyers may not suffer from the types of disabilities
noted by Rai and Moore because the lawyers may well have the
needed technical backgrounds to conduct claim constructions and
extensive experience in completing claim construction analyses.
Hence, there are reasons to expect that claim constructions in the
settlement processes that dominate the resolution of patent cases are
far less uncertain than the small fraction of analyses (perhaps as
small as 3% of filed patent cases according to Moore) that are
undertaken by district courts and that influence appellate reversal
rates.
C. Appellate Reversal Rates
Past studies of Federal Circuit claim construction reversal rates
have varied in at least three dimensions: (1) time covered; (2) rulings
considered; and (3) types of claim construction reversals measured. 2 1
A series of studies have examined Federal Circuit rulings since the
Supreme Court's Markman decision clarifying the central role of
trial courts in claim construction. However, the studies have
considered cases decided during different windows of time as
described below. Some analysts have considered only cases resulting
in Federal Circuit opinions addressing lower court claim
constructions while other analysts have considered these opinions
plus summary affirmances pursuant to Rule 36.22 Various analysts
have computed and reported at least three different types of reversal
rates related to claim constructions (often reporting rates for two or
more of these types of actions): (1) rates at which the Federal Circuit
overturned at least one lower court claim construction (that is, the
fraction of cases with at least one revised construction); (2) claim-
level rates for reversals by the Federal Circuit (that is, the fraction of
claims reviewed receiving revised constructions); and (3) rates at
which case outcomes were reversed due to changes in claim
constructions by the Federal Circuit.23 The last of these measures is
probably the most meaningful because it assesses the degree to
which Federal Circuit differences with lower court claim
21. Professor Moore has recognized these differences in approach and the difficulties they
raise in comparing the results of the different studies of claim construction reversals by the
Federal Circuit. See Moore, supra note 2, at 234-38.
22. Id. at 234-36; e.g., Schwartz, supra note 1, at 238.
23. E.g., Moore, supra note 2, at 238; Schwartz, supra note 1, at 240.
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constructions actually produced different outcomes for patent
litigants.
Case reversal rates due to Federal Circuit claim construction
revisions have been measured at 27% to 40% in studies
encompassing regular Federal Circuit opinions and summary
affirmances under Rule 3624 and at even higher reversal rates of 41%
to 53.5% in studies that ignored these summary affirmances. 25 This
subsection briefly describes these studies and their findings.
1. Gretchen Ann Bender
Analyzing 160 Federal Circuit evaluations of lower court claim
constructions between the date of the Supreme Court's Markman
decision and 2000, Gretchen Ann Bender found that "on appeal, the
Federal Circuit change[d] the claim construction in approximately
40% of the cases."2 7 Bender's analysis focused on numbers of cases
in which the Federal Circuit changed at least one lower court claim
construction. 28 Her assessment took into account both published and
unpublished Federal Circuit opinions, but excluded summary
affirmances under Rule 36.29 She did not report a figure for Federal
Circuit case reversals based on revised claim constructions. "
2. Christian A. Chu
Based on a review of opinions filed by the Federal Circuit
between January 1, 1998 and April 30, 2000 (excluding Rule 36
affirmances), Christian A. Chu found 179 patent cases that involved
express reviews of claim constructions." In these cases, the Federal
24. See, e.g., Gretchen Ann Bender, Uncertainty and Unpredictability in Patent Litigation:
The Time Is Ripe for a Consistent Claim Construction Methodology, 8 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 175,
206-07 (2001); Moore, supra note 1, at 2; Moore, supra note 2, at 233; Schwartz, supra note 1, at
234.
25. E.g., Christian A. Chu, Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit's Claim Construction
Trends, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1075, 1098-1100 (2001); Michael Saunders, A Survey of Post-
Phillips Claim Construction Cases, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 215, 233 (2007); Andrew T. Zidel,
Patent Claim Construction in the Trial Courts: A Study Showing the Need for Clear Guidance
from the Federal Circuit, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 711, 744-47 (2003).
26. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
27. Bender, supra note 24, at 207.
28. See id. at 202-08.
29. See id. at 207 & nn.216-17.
30. See id at 175-222.
31. Chu, supra note 25, at 1092, 1104.
Spring 20 10] 995
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol.43:981
Circuit modified claim interpretations in 78 cases, or 44% of the
total. 32 However, some of these modifications did not change case
results. Chu found that only 53 out of the 78 cases were reversed on
the basis of the Federal Circuit's reviews of claim constructions. 3
Thus, Chu concluded that "the Federal Circuit reversed 29.6% of
cases involving an express review of claim construction."3 4
3. Kimberly A. Moore (2001)
Based on an analysis of 323 claim construction cases appealed
to the Federal Circuit from April 23, 1996 (the day the Supreme
Court issued the Markman decision) through December 31, 2000
(including summary affirmances under Rule 36), Moore found that
the Federal Circuit disagreed with at least one claim construction by
the relevant district courts in 33% of all claim construction appeals to
the Federal Circuit. " Most but not all of these disagreements over
claim construction resulted in case reversals.36 Focusing on those
claim construction disagreements that produced changes in case
outcomes, Moore found that the Federal Circuit appeals considered
in her 2001 study "show an overall case reversal/vacate rate of 27%
in the database directly attributable to errors in district court claim
construction.""
4. Kimberly A. Moore (2005)
A few years later, Moore reassessed the Federal Circuit's
reversal rate for claim construction appeals based on a larger set of
decided appeals. In this study, Moore once again considered all
forms of Federal Circuit resolutions of claim construction appeals,
emphasizing in particular the importance of including Rule 36
affirmances. 3 ' Her 2005 study considered Federal Circuit claim
construction appeals from 1996 (after Markman was decided)
through 2003:
32. Id. at 1104.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Moore, supra note 1, at 8-9, 11.
36. Id. at 13.
37. Id. at 14.
38. Moore, supra note 2, at 234-37.
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After a de novo appeal, the Federal Circuit held that 34.5%
of the terms were wrongly construed by the district court. In
the [cases considered in Moore's study], the Federal Circuit
held at least one term was wrongly construed in 37.5% of
the cases. In the cases in which one or more term was
wrongly construed, the erroneous claim construction
required the Federal Circuit to reverse or vacate the district
court's judgment in 29.7% of the cases.39
Interestingly, Moore found that patent holders and asserted
infringers suffered from about the same reversal rates in pressing
appeals to the Federal Circuit.40 District court claim constructions
that favored patent holders were reversed 32.3% of the time, while
claim constructions that favored asserted infringers were reversed
33.2% of the time.41
Moore presented a compelling argument that the full impact of
Federal Circuit rulings on lower court claim constructions should be
measured from all forms of dispositions including summary
affirmances under Rule 36. Because Rule 36 summary affirmances
express the views of the Federal Circuit on the legitimacy of lower
court claim constructions, Moore correctly concluded that analyses
that omit these summary affirmances will almost certainly produce
reversal rates that are "inaccurate" and "artificially high." 42
Moore gave the following estimate of the size of errors in
reversal rates omitting Rule 36 affirmances:
To understand the magnitude of the error in [omitting
consideration of Rule 36 summary affirmances], consider
this study. Of the 1100 claim construction terms appealed in
this study, 15.5% (170) were resolved by Rule 36 summary
affirmance, 34.7% (328) were resolved via non-precedential
opinion of the court, and 49.8% (548) were resolved via
precedential opinion of the court. The resultant reversal rate
of 34.5% considered all of these cases. If the Rule 36
summary affirmances are left out, the reversal rate becomes
40.8%.43
39. Id. at 239.
40. Id. at 241.
41. Id. at 241 tbl.1.
42. Id. at 234-36.
43. Id. at 236.
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5. Judge Randall R. Rader's Opinion in
Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc.
One particularly influential (but frustratingly undocumented and
unexplained) study of claim construction reversals was relied upon
by Federal Circuit Judge Randall R. Rader in his separate opinion in
Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc. " Dissenting from the Federal
Circuit's en banc ruling in that case that trial court claim
constructions should be reviewed de novo without deference, Rader
cited a study of claim construction reversals from an unnamed source
as evidence of the dangers of high rates of Federal Circuit revisions
of lower court claim constructions:
[O]ne study shows that the plenary standard of review has
produced reversal, in whole or in part, of almost 40% of all
claim constructions since Markman L A reversal rate in this
range reverses more than the work of numerous trial courts;
it also reverses the benefits of Markman I. In fact, this
reversal rate, hovering near 50%, is the worst possible.
Even a rate that was much higher would provide greater
certainty.45
Rader provided a little more information on this study in a
footnote:
[The 40% reversal rate] figure is based on a survey of every
patent decision rendered by the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit between 5 April 1995 (the date Markman I
was decided) and 24 November 1997. A total of 246 patent
cases, originating in the Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences (BPAI), the district courts, and the Court of
Federal Claims, were evaluated. Of the 246 cases, 141 cases
expressly reviewed claim construction issues. Among these
141 decisions, this court reversed, in whole or in part, 54 or
38.3% of all claim constructions. With respect to the district
court and Court of Federal Claims cases, the rate of reversal
of claim constructions is 47 out of 126 or 37.3%.46
44. 138 F.3d 1448, 1473-76 (1998) (en banc) (Rader, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 1476 (footnote omitted). The reference to Markman I in this quote relates to the
Federal Circuit's en banc decision clarifying the claim construction responsibilities of federal
district courts in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
46. Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1476 n.4.
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The study cited by Rader produced a reversal rate figure
comparable to other studies that omitted summary affirmances under
Rule 36.47 The failure of Judge Rader to note whether these summary
affirmances were included in the reversal rate he cited may undercut
the validity of some of his conclusions, as noted by Moore.4 8 She
found in her research that 15.5% of claim construction appeals to the
Federal Circuit were resolved by summary affirmances under Rule
36.49 As Moore pointed out, omitting as many as 15% of the relevant
Federal Circuit dispositions of claim construction cases-particularly
where all of the omitted dispositions were affirmances and would
contribute uniformly to lowering the claim construction reversal
rate-was likely to produce a significantly higher reversal rate than
an analysis that included the summary affirmances.so Hence, without
greater clarity as to whether Rule 36 affirmances were included, it is
hard to know what to make of the 38.3% claim construction reversal
rate figure cited by Judge Rader.
6. Michael Saunders
Michael Saunders based his study of claim construction
reversals on Federal Circuit rulings from July 13, 2005, immediately
after the Phillips decision (in which the court clarified its views on
the sources to be considered in claim construction5 2), through
September 13, 2006.53 The study excluded Rule 36 affirmances,
meaning that it was likely to produce higher reversal rates than
studies like Moore's that included Rule 36 affirmances. Comparing
his results to those in Chu's study (which also excluded Rule 36
affirmances), Saunders summarized his results as follows:
"Compared to the results of Chu's study, the overall reversal rate in
claim construction cases, excluding summary affirmances, is 53.5%,
slightly up from 47.3% for Chu's study. Similarly, the percent of
47. These further studies and their results are described below in Parts II.C.6 and II.C.8,
infra.
48. See Moore, supra note 2, at 237-38.
49. Id. at 236-37.
50. Id.
51. See id. at 237-38.
52. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
53. Saunders, supra note 25, at 221-24, 235.
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cases where at least one construction changed is 39.5%, only slightly
down from 44% from Chu's study."5 4
7. David L. Schwartz
Based on a study of all Federal Circuit dispositions (including
Rule 36 affirmances) between the date of the Marknan decision and
June 30, 2007 in cases where the parties disputed a district court's
construction of a claim term, David L. Schwartz found that the
Federal Circuit's reversals indicated that the court believed that
"32.5% of the terms were 'wrongly' construed by the lower court.
Also, 38.2% of cases had at least one term wrongly construed.
Moreover, 29.7% of the cases had to be reversed, vacated, and/or
remanded because of an erroneous claim construction."5
8. Andrew T. Zidel
Andrew T. Zidel studied claim construction cases decided by the
Federal Circuit in 2001 (excluding Rule 36 affirmances) and found a
case reversal rate (in whole or in part) of 41.5%.56 He also studied
the reasons cited by the Federal Circuit for its reversals of lower
court claim constructions. " The most frequent reasons included (1)
the improper importation of limitations from a patent specification
into claims; (2) the failure to adopt the perspective of a party with
ordinary skill in the relevant technology area when construing
claims; (3) the misuse of dictionaries to give meaning to terms in
construing claims; and (4) errors in working with means-plus-
function style claims.5
9. Summary of the Findings
Moore's and Schwartz's analyses of Federal Circuit claim
construction results seem to be the best of the above studies because
their studies included Rule 36 summary affirmances. These analyses
found claim construction reversal rates that were remarkably similar
over time. Moore, in her 2005 study focusing on Federal Circuit
dispositions from 1996 through 2003, found a case reversal/vacate
54. Id. at 236.
55. Schwartz, supra note 1, at 248-49 (footnote omitted).
56. Zidel, supra note 25, at 744-46.
57. Id. at 748-52.
58. Id.
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rate due to claim construction analyses of 29.7%,"9 up slightly from
the 27% found in her earlier study focusing on 1996 to 2000.60
Schwartz, looking at cases from 1996 to 2007, found a
reversal/vacate rate of 29.7/o-a rate identical to Moore's
measurement. While Schwartz's study seems to have subsumed the
cases considered in Moore's studies, the consistency of Moore's
results for 1996 to 2003 with those Schwartz reached based on the
longer period of 1996 to 2007 suggests that the rate for 2003 to 2007
must have been roughly equal to that for 1996 to 2003.62 The
consistency of this rate over time, despite the differences of case
types, judges, and standards of review, is remarkable.
D. Implications of Federal Circuit
Reversal Rates for Claim Constructions
A number of analysts who have studied Federal Circuit reversal
rates for claim constructions have concluded that these rates are
excessive and indicative of major flaws in claim construction
standards and processes. The remarks of Moore are typical in her
highly negative interpretations of the implications of these measured
reversal rates:
[Findings suggest that] district court judges improperly
construe patent claim terms in 33% of the cases appealed to
the Federal Circuit. This is problematic for two reasons.
First, it raises concerns about the efficiency of an
adjudication system where no appellate review of these
decisions is permitted until all issues are resolved by the
trial court applying its claim construction....
Second, the 33% error rate for claim construction creates
doubt about the abilities of district court judges to
adjudicate complex technical patent cases.6 3
While Moore's comments are insightful and accurate with
respect to potential trial inefficiencies, her comments should not be
59. Moore, supra note 2, at 239.
60. Moore, supra note 1, at 14.
61. Schwartz, supra note 1, at 249.
62. This conclusion follows as a mathematical certainty because, if the rate was 29.7% for
the period of 1996 to 2007 and also 29.7% for the lesser period of 1996 to 2003, it must have also
been about 29.7% for the other lesser period of 2003 to 2007.
63. Moore, supra note 1, at 2-3 (citations omitted).
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extended beyond the narrow range of patent cases litigated to
completed results in district courts. Were it possible for district
courts to regularly give definitive claim constructions that would
hold up in most cases on appeal, trial procedures would no doubt be
streamlined and cases would be tried with less duplicative effort and
expense. However, there are two reasons why we should exercise
caution in seeking to improve district court efforts in this area, at
least based on the evidence of Federal Circuit reversal rates.
First, it is not clear that the problems experienced by district
courts in claim constructions at trial-that is, apparent claim
construction "errors" or differences from Federal Circuit views as
indicated by reversals-are shared in the case settlement analyses by
trial counsel and clients who resolve most patent cases. As will be
argued later, settled cases are often less complex and uncertain
regarding outstanding, material facts than those cases resolved
through trials and appeals. Furthermore, counsel and clients
conducting claim constructions as part of settlement discussions will
often have the technical backgrounds and claim construction
experience that district courts lack. Hence, the Federal Circuit's
present guidance on claim construction may be unworthy of
significant reforms if this guidance is sufficient to aid parties in
resolving most patent disputes through case settlements.
Second, focusing only on cases that do go to trial, changes in
Federal Circuit guidance or standards of review regarding district
court claim constructions may not alter appellate reversal rates
substantially because these rates are not at bottom the result of errors
by district courts, but are rather the result of uncertainty-preferring
appellate case selection practices ensuring high reversal rates of
lower court claim constructions on appeal. As claim constructions
are conducted under new standards, a set of cases will remain with
some lingering uncertainties. As a result, litigants operating under
new standards will just tend to appeal the cases with remaining
uncertainties, leading to a still-high reversal rate on appeal. Hence,
extensive revisions in district court guidance or practices to "fix"
Federal Circuit reversal rates may be a lost cause because these rates
are not consequences of mistakes or errors by district courts, but
rather are direct products of uncertainties and plausible alternative
findings in the small fraction of litigated patent cases that result in
Federal Circuit appeals. The reasons why cases appealed to the
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Federal Circuit diverge in characteristics from patent disputes
generally are discussed in the next part of this Article.
III. SELECTION PROCESSES SHAPING FEDERAL CIRCUIT CLAIM
CONSTRUCTION APPEALS-WHY FEDERAL CIRCUIT APPEALS ARE
UNCERTAIN OUTLIERS IN THE FIELD OF CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
The significance of Federal Circuit claim construction reversal
rates and the negative implications about claim construction
standards that can be drawn from those rates are undercut by the fact
that these rates are based on Federal Circuit appeals that are likely to
be highly uncharacteristic of patent disputes and infringement
analyses generally. Federal Circuit appeals of lower court claim
constructions are shaped by selection processes that ensure these
appeals are outliers and not characteristic of claim construction
issues confronted by litigants and legal advisors generally. "
Reversal rates for these abnormal cases provide poor measures
of the quality of either district court claim construction analyses or
associated Federal Circuit standards. 65 Rather, these appeals-and
64. The impact of selection effects in making appealed patent cases outliers and
unrepresentative of the full set of legal disputes in the patent field is not limited to patent
litigation. A number of researchers have recognized that litigation processes tend to select
distinctive types of cases for trials and appeals, causing those selected cases to be atypical of all
disputes raising similar legal issues. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Models and Trial
Outcomes in Civil Rights and Prisoner Cases, 77 GEO. L.J. 1567, 1568 (1989) (describing an
"expectations theory" that explains why tried cases might not reflect the characteristics of the
pool of all disputes). In summarizing this point in particularly colorful terms, Karl Llewellyn once
noted that litigated cases bear the same relationship to the underlying pool of disputes "as does
homicidal mania or sleeping sickness, to our normal life." K. N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE
BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 58 (2d ed. 1951).
65. Analysts have strongly cautioned researchers against drawing broad conclusions about
the merit of legal standards from studies of appellate decisions alone due to the severe selection
effects governing those decisions. For example, George Priest and Benjamin Klein, looking at the
small numbers of cases of all types that reach appeals observed that:
It is well known ... that only a very small fraction of disputes comes to trial and an
even smaller fraction is appealed. In a study of insurance company claims files, H.
Laurence Ross reports that, of his sample, only 4.2 percent of claims ultimately
reached trial and 0.2 percent of claims were appealed. . . . It is very difficult to infer
specific characteristics from observations of 0.2 percent or less of a population,
especially where there is no evidence that the observations (the disputes selected for
appeal) were selected randomly.
Priest & Klein, supra note 20, at 2. The fraction of filed patent cases resulting in completed trials
is similar to the small figures cited by Priest and Klein. See Moore, supra note 1, at 30 (citations
omitted) (only 5% of patent cases reach trials). Somewhat more patent cases with completed trials
are appealed than in Priest and Klein's study, but still a very small fraction of all cases. See
Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases-An Empirical Peek Inside the Black Box,
99 MICH. L. REv. 365, 380, 397 (2000) (51% of fully tried patent cases are appealed, meaning
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the high levels of reversals that result-reflect the effectiveness of
litigants (or potential litigants) in settling those cases with relatively
clear claim constructions, leaving only those cases with uncertain
claim constructions for Federal Circuit appeals. Given this filtering
of Federal Circuit appeals, the cases reviewed by the Federal Circuit
involve a heavy dose of uncertain cases with plausible support for
alternate holdings. It is not surprising that alternate rulings-that is,
reversals under a de novo standard of review-occur frequently at
the Federal Circuit level.
Some studies have found that as few as 3% of patent cases filed
in federal courts go to trial66 and even fewer are ultimately
appealed. 67 The few cases with claim construction issues that are
appealed seem likely to be mostly cases with known claim
construction uncertainties that have lingered through the appellate
stage. These uncertainties have caused the litigants to refrain from
case settlements despite the fact finding and increased understanding
of claim construction issues that the litigants have gained in prior
stages of their patent litigation. Federal Circuit appeals of claim
construction cases result in reversals at a substantial rate because the
appealed cases have been differentially selected to be highly
uncertain and highly likely to produce reversals. 68 Appellate reversal
rates simply reflect the uncertainty of claim construction issues in
cases that are selected for appeal because of their perceived claim
construction uncertainty in the eyes of the litigants.
As the results in a very small number of appealed patent cases
that overrepresent cases with high uncertainty, reversal rates in cases
appealed to the Federal Circuit offer poor measures of the overall
clarity of the Federal Circuit's claim construction standards and
guidance. The merit of the Federal Circuit's standards and guidance
for claim construction analyses should be evaluated based on the
predictability of patent claim analyses in the patent system generally.
that no more than 2.5% (5% x 0.51) of filed patent cases are fully tried and appealed to the
Federal Circuit). Hence, Priest and Klein's recommendation of caution in reaching significant
conclusions about legal standards from appellate case results seems equally applicable to the
small slice of patent cases that proceed to Federal Circuit appeals.
66. See Moore, supra note 15, at 84; see also Moore, supra note 1, at 30 (estimating that
approximately 5% of filed patent cases result in completed trials based on earlier data).
67. One study found that only 51% of patent cases with completed trials were appealed.
Moore, supra note 65, at 397.
68. See Schwartz, supra note 1, at 226.
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For reasons that are discussed below, the sufficiency of these
standards in shaping and informing case settlement discussions may
be far more important in the patent field than the influence of claim
construction standards on patent appeals and reversal rates.
The first section of this part describes how selection processes
filtering cases chosen for appeals tend to produce settlements of
relatively certain cases and appeals of relatively uncertain ones. The
second section of this part describes the extent to which Federal
Circuit appeals of patent cases reflect only a small fraction of
contested patent cases, with the great bulk of such cases being
resolved through settlements rather than completed trials and
appeals. The third section describes why the narrow slice of claim
construction cases resulting in appeals is not likely to be
representative of claim construction controversies generally, but
rather is likely to be systematically skewed towards uncertain cases
that the parties involved saw very differently at the time of the
appeals.
A. Modeling Trials and Appeals as Failures to Settle:
Why Appealed Cases Are Heavy with Uncertainties
1. Case Selection Effects Influence Trial Outcomes
George L. Priest and Benjamin Klein described how selection
effects influence the characteristics of tried cases in their seminal
article The Selection of Disputes for Litigation. " Priest and Klein
treated litigated cases as those resulting from failures to settle." By
considering why parties would settle cases, they sought to describe
the features of cases that would tend not to settle and that would
therefore be likely to go to trial and contribute to trial outcomes and
success rates. This conceptualization of tried cases and success rates
at trial as products of case selection processes has been very
influential and has formed the basis for law and economics studies of
litigation processes in many fields.
69. Priest & Klein, supra note 20.
70. Id. at 6.
71. According to one set of observers, "Few results in the law and economics of litigation
have sparked as much interest as [Priest and Klein's] hypothesis." Daniel Kessler, Thomas Meites
& Geoffrey Miller, Explaining Deviations from the Fifty-Percent Rule: A Multimodal Approach
to the Selection of Cases for Litigation, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 233, 233 (1996); see also Jeff Yates &
Elizabeth Coggins, The Intersection of Judicial Attitudes and Litigant Selection Theories:
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Priest and Klein's selection theory asserts that trial outcomes are
largely determined not by judges and juries, but rather by the
strategic behavior of litigants in selecting cases to file and to pursue
through completed trials.72 Forward-thinking litigants project the
probable results of their cases, discount the amounts that they are
likely to gain or lose, and then seek settlements if their joint
estimates of case value are similar." Under Priest and Klein's view,
these sorts of decisions determine the bulk of case outcomes.
The decisions of judges and juries-while obviously not
irrelevant to trial outcomes-operate only within the bounds of the
types of cases that are brought to them. Judges only have
opportunities to decide cases and to articulate new legal standards as
reactive individuals.74 "[C]ases that reach a judicial decision are the
cases that the parties have chosen not to settle and thus represent a
subset of disputes chosen by the parties, not by the judges.""
Priest and Klein concluded that cases with few uncertainties-in
which both sides similarly evaluate the cases and come up with
similar estimates of case value by taking their likelihood of success
and claim size into account-would tend to settle because the parties
would be able to come to agreement on settlement terms. 6 This
would leave cases with significant uncertainties and a high potential
for differing value assessments by the different parties as the primary
type of unsettled cases that would proceed to trial. Priest and Klein
felt that settlement processes of this sort fundamentally shape (by
selective elimination of other sorts of cases) the features of cases
presented for trials, frequently causing these cases to diverge
substantially from the average mix of legal controversies.
Explaining U.S. Supreme Court Decision-Making, 29 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 263, 276 (2009)
(noting that Priest and Klein's "Selection Hypothesis theory has enjoyed wide application in the
law and economics field").
72. Priest & Klein, supra note 20, at 4-5.
73. See Yates & Coggins, supra note 71, at 263, 266.
74. See id. at 265 ("[C]ourts are essentially reactive institutions. That is, courts do not
formally initiate policy-making. Instead, they rely on litigants to bring issues before them for
legal resolution.").
75. Frank B. Cross, Decisionmaking in the U.S. Circuit Courts ofAppeals, 91 CAL. L. REv.
1457, 1491 (2003).
76. Priest & Klein, supra note 20, at 16-17.
77. Id.
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2. Impacts of Selection Effects on Appellate Outcomes
While Priest and Klein were primarily concerned with trial
results and the selection of cases that are tried, they recognized that
their model of case selection applies equally to the selection of tried
cases for appeal. In comments that bear directly on the Federal
Circuit's reversal rates under scrutiny in this Article, Priest and Klein
provide the following cautions regarding the analysis of appellate
case results:
If the stakes to the litigants are equal, a trial court decision
will be appealed, just as a dispute will be litigated, only
where parties differ in their expectations of the outcome on
appeal. Thus, for cases in which the stakes are equal to the
parties, the reversal rate on appeal will tend toward 50
percent regardless of the identity of the trial judge, the
extent of his legal abilities, ambitiousness or economic
interests. Indeed, the rate of reversal on appeal will not be
affected, in general, by the similarity of views of the trial
judge and the appellate court on legal issues."
On appeal, where the views and even the biases of particular
appellate judges may be studied and taken into account by counsel,
selection processes may ensure that cases presented for appeal are
ones that are likely to raise contentions among judges at the appellate
level. This type of analytic uncertainty will result because cases that
multiple judges on an appellate court are likely to see similarly will
be settled in accordance with these shared judicial views and will
tend not to rise to a completed appeal. This impact of selection
effects in filtering out cases with predictable results at the appellate
level and presenting for completed appeals mostly contentious cases
likely to engage different views of multiple judges was described by
Jeff Yates and Elizabeth Coggins in the context of Supreme Court
litigation as follows:
With regard to Supreme Court outcomes, even though the
Justices choose the cases that they hear from a large pool of
78. Id. at 29; see also Kessler, Meites & Miller, supra note 71, at 235 (noting that the 50%
rule developed by Priest and Klein predicts appellate reversal rates similarly to trial court success
rates); Yates & Coggins, supra note 71, at 268-69 (observing that analyses of both trial and
appellate court results would be enhanced by consideration of case selection effects predicted by
Priest and Klein's model).
79. Priest & Klein, supra note 20, at 51-52.
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petitions, litigants must ultimately choose to appeal their
cases for the Court to have the opportunity to select them.
Under a Selection Theory approach, this phenomenon plays
an important role in the decision-making process of the
High Court because it frames the nature and quality of the
cases heard by the Court. This point serves as the basic
premise of the Litigant Selection Model-the litigants have
likely considered the attitudes and ideological inclinations
of the Justices in their decision to appeal (or not appeal)
their cases to the Court. Given that litigants and their
attorneys are undoubtedly aware of the well-known
ideological proclivities of the Justices, they likely sort out
or settle cases that have relatively clear or predictable
outcomes and, hence, the Court does not hear them. In this
regard, the cases that are appealed to the Court are those
that are not readily classified as winners or losers by the
litigants and their attorneys. Thus, the direct influence of
judicial ideology on the outcomes of these remaining
''uncertain" cases is likely inconsequential since litigants
have predetermined that such potential ideological biases
are not at play. In the words of Priest and Klein, "the parties
will act themselves to neutralize judicial bias.""
Litigants can take a variety of trends or norms in courts into
account in a similar fashion, leaving only those cases for appeal that
are still uncertain given those trends or norms. Furthermore,
sophisticated litigants can take the latest theories of judicial decision
making into account-including predictions of strategic behaviors or
ideology-influenced decisions by the relevant judges-in projecting
probable appellate results and taking the implications of these
theories into account in reaching settlements. Hence, appellate case
selection processes should take predictable influences of judicial
ideology or bias into account on the front end-that is, in privately
constructed case valuations and settlement agreements-leaving
mostly cases with significant uncertainties under ideology or bias
influences to be heard on appeal and causing the influence of these
factors on appellate outcomes to largely be nullified. " The influence
80. Yates & Coggins, supra note 71, at 266 (quoting Priest & Klein, supra note 20, at 37).
81. See id. at 263. Of course, this effect will only hold true to the extent that the ideologies
emphasized by or motivating particular judges are apparent before particular cases are presented
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of these factors on appellate outcomes will be small because the
cases selected for appeal will either be ones where the ideologies or
biases of the judges involved are in conflict (meaning that these
factors do not suggest a result) or ones where the ideologies or biases
of the judges are unknown (meaning that these factors again do not
suggest a result).
B. Priest and Klein's Model ofLitigated and
Appealed Cases as Settlement Failures
Priest and Klein described a generalized model for analyzing
settlement decisions leading to the selection of cases for litigation
and appeal. 2 They specified that their model was built on the
following major assumptions:
1. Litigants or appellants premise their decisions about
whether to settle or continue a case to trial or appeal solely
based on economic considerations, "including the expected
costs to the parties of favorable or adverse decisions, the
information that parties possess about the likelihood of
success at trial, and the direct costs of litigation and
settlement."
2. Litigants are presumed to form and act on rational
estimates of the likely trial or appellate decision in their
case, whether it is based on applicable legal precedents or
judicial or jury biases.
3. Litigants will tend to settle cases where there is an
overlap of the ranges of settlement terms that the plaintiffs
and defendants see as attractive from their respective
perspectives (or a near overlap, with the gap between the
ranges no bigger than the litigation costs projected for the
remainder of the litigation).
4. Conversely, cases that are not settled and that proceed to
trials and later appeals are those for which the litigants have
for appeal. The same is true for evolving views on legal issues. Where the values, ideologies, or
substantive legal views of a particular judge are evolving in unexpected ways or changing
suddenly, it may be hard for litigants to take these into account in selecting cases for appeal.
Hence, these circumstances may produce appeals where newly influential values, ideologies, or
substantive views of particular judges have unexpected impacts on appellate decisions. See id. at
285.
82. Priest & Klein, supra note 20, at 4.
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distinctly different conceptions or information sets such that
they have highly disparate case value estimations that do
not overlap and that preclude them from reaching
settlement agreements."
Based on this framework, Priest and Klein posited that plaintiffs
and defendants would be willing to settle cases (at least those turning
primarily on monetary relief) with payments falling within the
following range:
The plaintiffs minimum settlement demand (A, or asking
price) and the defendant's maximum settlement offer (B, or
bidding price) may be represented as follows:
A = Pp(J) - Cp + Sp (5a)
and
B = Pd(J) Cd- Sd, (5b)
where J is the expected judgment should a plaintiff
(liability) verdict be rendered; Cp and Cd are litigation costs
to the plaintiff and defendant, respectively, assumed
arbitrarily to be set at "optimal" levels; and S, and Sd are the
respective settlement costs. Note that we describe the stakes
of the dispute to the parties solely in terms of the expected
judgment, J.84
In these equations, P(J) refers to the probability-discounted
value of achieving a judgment of value (J). " Priest and Klein saw
continued litigation rather than settlement as likely where the
following conditions are met:
83. Id. at 4-6.
84. Id. at 12 (footnote omitted).
85. Thus, if a party estimates that there is a 30% chance of achieving a judgment J of
$1,000,000, then P(J) would equal $1,000,000 multiplied by .30 or $300,000. Pp(J) refers to the
probability discounted case result in dollar terms as estimated by the plaintiff, while Pd(J) reflects
the same estimate from the viewpoint of the defendant.
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A sufficient condition for litigation is that the plaintiffs
minimum demand (A) exceed the defendant's maximum bid
(B). This condition may be rewritten from equations (5a)
and (5b) as
C-S
Pp - Pd > (6)
J
where C = Cd + Cp and S = So +S.
In short, Priest and Klein concluded that cases pursued to trial
(and therefore appearing in litigation success rates) would tend to be
ones for which the relationship described in equation (6) was true. "
The same analysis, when applied to appealed cases, indicates that
cases pursued to appeals will be ones for which the relationship in
equation (6) holds true, taking into account probabilities of success,
judgment amounts, projected appellate litigation costs, and projected
settlement costs as these stand at the point of decisions to pursue
appeals.
Later analysts recognized that Priest and Klein's model was
derived from the divergent expectations of litigants about case
values:
The 50 percent rule is actually a limiting implication of a
selection effect that arises out of a simple divergent
expectations model of the decision to litigate. In that model,
each party estimates the quality of the plaintiff s claim with
error, and the plaintiff settles when the defendant's offer is
at least as large as the plaintiffs estimate of the value of her
claim. Priest and Klein observe that cases selected for
litigation are likely to be the difficult and uncertain ones-
that is, the cases in which the true quality of the claim is
close to the quality level needed for the plaintiff to win if
the claim were to be tried-because the clear-cut cases will
be more likely to settle before trial (or may never evolve
into filed cases at all). The difficult and uncertain cases, in
turn, are likely to be those that, on average, result in about
86. Priest & Klein, supra note 20, at 13.
87. Id.
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half the victories going to one party and about half to the
other. "
Or, as Yates and Coggins summarize the process, "the cases that
are close or uncertain, or in which the parties have widely divergent
expectations as to potential outcomes, are not settled and end up
going to trial and appeal."8 9
C. Implications of the Model for Litigated Case Characteristics
Priest and Klein use this model to reach three important
conclusions about litigated cases (and, by extension of their model
one level further in litigation, about appealed cases):
First, litigated cases are not randomly selected subsets of all
legal disputes, nor are they fairly representative of all legal disputes.
Rather, because of systematic settlement processes that filter out
cases with relatively certain outcomes, litigated cases are frequently
ones with a high likelihood of significant uncertainties affecting case
outcomes. Cases fail to settle and proceed to trial, in Priest and
Klein's estimation, because the material uncertainties still present in
the cases are seen differently by the parties, precluding those parties
from reaching a settlement. This means that tried cases tend to have
more uncertainties about material issues of law and fact than are
present in most legal disputes. Likewise, appealed cases involve a
nonrandom subset of tried cases, most often involving tried cases
that still have material uncertainties after the clarifying steps of trial
testimony and district court rulings. 90
Second, because tried and appealed cases have significant
uncertainties justifying the costs of continued litigation, they are
frequently not representative of average or typical legal disputes
generally. Hence, conclusions reached about trial success rates and
appellate reversal rates should not be extended to conclusions about
the impacts of particular legal standards on legal disputes generally.91
Third, trial and appellate success rates may have little to do with
differences in legal standards and may be relatively unchanging
despite alterations in standards. This is because the cases that are
88. Kessler, Meites & Miller, supra note 71, at 234 (footnote omitted).
89. Yates & Coggins, supra note 71, at 267.
90. Priest & Klein, supra note 20, at 1-5.
91. Id. at 1-2.
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subjected to trials and appeals are selected in light of the applicable
standards and tend to be cases in which the parties have relatively
equal chances of success given the prevailing standards at that time.
Priest and Klein concluded that this "will create a strong bias toward
a rate of success for plaintiffs at trial or appellants at appeal of 50
percent regardless of the substantive standard of law."9 2 Cases which
have a higher likelihood of success for one party, taking into account
all factors that the parties can perceive as having an impact on the
probabilities of success, will tend to be settled and not appear in the
group of litigated cases."
Where some of the assumptions underlying their model do not
hold, Priest and Klein predicted that selection processes will tend to
bias trial and appellate success rates away from 50% success rates.
They offered several specific predictions about the directions that
success rates will tend to move under conditions varying from their
basic assumptions. For example, they predicted that where opposing
parties in cases do not have the same amounts at stake, prevailing
success levels will tend to move away from the 50% level, with the
party having the most at stake tending to prevail more often than the
party's opponent. This will occur because the party with more at
stake will tend to settle doubtful cases and only allow cases to
proceed to trials and appeals that the party with more at stake is
especially likely to win.94
D. Predicting Success Rates for Claim Construction Cases
Priest and Klein offered no particular analysis of success rates in
patent cases, much less the subset of these cases involving claim
construction issues. However, several commentators have recognized
that the case selection model developed by Priest and Klein might
explain high appellate reversal rates for patent cases generally" and
92. Id. at 5.
93. See id. at 17-20.
94. Id. at 28-29; see id. at 40-43 (applying this settlement theory to products liability,
malpractice, and worker injury cases).
95. See Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, How Are Patent Cases Resolved? An Empirical
Examination of the Adjudication and Settlement of Patent Disputes, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 237,
243 & n.47 (2006); Alan C. Marco, The Selection Effects (and Lack Thereoj) in Patent Litigation:
Evidence from Trials, 4 ToPics IN ECON. ANALYSIS & POL'Y 1, 3 (2004). See generally Kessler,
Meites & Miller, supra note 71, at 234 ("[A]n extensive literature has documented that plaintiffs
generally win far fewer than 50 percent of cases at the trial court or appellate level.").
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for claim construction appeals in particular.96 Other analysts have
questioned whether the selection model offers a useful analytic
framework for assessing claim construction appeals, noting that
litigation success rates and appellate reversal rates for patent cases
have not been measured at or near 50% levels.97
Of course, Priest and Klein did not predict 50% rates for all
cases, but only those in which case litigants approach and perform
case value assessments and settlement analyses in roughly equal
manners. This means, for instance, that the 50% rate is only
predicted to hold where the litigants perceive that they have similar
amounts at stake at trial or in an appeal, as well as roughly equal
abilities to predict case outcomes and equal risk preferences about
those outcomes.98 Where this is not the case, Priest and Klein
predicted that success rates may diverge substantially from 50%.99
Priest and Klein described several litigant and case features that
they felt might raise or lower trial or appellate success rates, causing
those rates to move away from 50%. '" Other commentators have
added additional factors that they believe will tend to shift trial or
appeal success rates away from 50%, assuming that Priest and
Klein's model holds true. 1' The common feature of all of these
factors is that each provides a reason why a litigant would tend to
settle more or less cases than would be true in the absence of the
factor. A factor that increases the likelihood that a litigant will settle
some weaker cases will tend to produce a higher success rate for that
litigant because only a relatively strong and easily winnable mix of
cases (from the perspective of that litigant) will be left to go to trial
or appeal and influence success rates. Conversely, a factor-such as
the risk-preferring nature of the litigant-that causes the party to
refuse to settle some relatively weak cases will tend to reduce that
96. See Moore, supra note 2, at 240; Moore, supra note 15, at 83-90.
97. See Schwartz, supra note 1, at 243 n. 123. But see Marco, supra note 95, at 42 (finding,
based on a study of patent cases litigated from 1970 to 1997, that "the win rate for patents that go
to trial is biased towards 50%"). Federal Judicial Center records for patent trials from 1979 to
1995 also reflect a plaintiff win rate of 45% to 55%. Id. at 6.
98. See generally Kessler, Meites & Miller, supra note 71, at 233.
99. Priest & Klein, supra note 20, at 28-29, 40-43.
100. Id. at 28-29.
101. Kessler, Meites & Miller, supra note 71, at 241-48; Yates & Coggins, supra note 71, at
285. Some of the factors likely to pull success rates in patent appeals away from 50% rates are
discussed infra.
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party's success rate because a broader range of weak cases will still
go to trial relative to the mix that would proceed absent that factor.
1. Some Case-Specific Factors Potentially Shifting Reversal Rates
a. Patent holder stakes in future litigation
A sense on the part of patent holders that more is at stake in
claim construction cases than just the damages liability faced by
asserted infringers may cause appellate success rates to diverge from
50% in favor of more wins by patent holders. 102 Moore recognized
that this asymmetry of interests may influence appellate case
selections and reversal rates, noting that in many cases patent holders
may perceive that they have more at stake in litigation that contests
the validity and scope of patents than do the defendants in those
cases. " Patent holders may feel that the complete future value of the
enforcement of their patents is at stake in litigation testing the
validity and scope of the patents, while defendants may only feel that
the amounts claimed as damages in particular cases (or the
immediate losses to the defendants resulting from restrictive
injunctions in those particular cases) are at stake. This disparity in
the parties' perspectives would tend to cause patent holders to be
more concerned than defendants about weak cases and to prefer to
settle these cases rather than going to trial. The resulting case
selection effects would shift trial results (and later appellate reversal
rates) toward higher success rates for patent holders (that is, success
rates of over 50% at trial and on appeal).
Another type of concern about future enforcement (or the threat
of it) may influence patent litigation by patent holders hoping to
license their patents. Early in a course of licensing, a patent holder
may seek to sue an infringer who refuses to take an offered license,
with the intent of establishing the patent holder's seriousness about
patent enforcement and the need for the party resisting the license,
and other similarly situated parties, to obtain licenses or risk patent
litigation and liability. The stakes for a defendant in a patent
enforcement suit brought for this purpose are equal to the value of
the liability amounts under contention in that case, plus the further
costs to the defendant of complying with any injunction that might
102. Moore, supra note 2, at 241.
103. Id. at 240-41.
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issue in the case. However, the amounts at stake for the plaintiff
patent holder are not only the past damages and future licensing
amounts that the patent holder may obtain from the defendant, but
also additional enhanced licensing fees that the patent holder will be
more likely to obtain from other licensees if the litigation is
successful. Because of these implications of successful patent
enforcement outside the immediate litigation between the plaintiff
and defendant, patent litigation undertaken in this context for the
purpose of promoting a broader licensing program will tend to cause
plaintiff patent holders to perceive that they have more at stake than
the defendants they are suing. All else being equal, this disparity in
what the parties perceive is at issue should cause plaintiffs in these
kinds of cases to have greater success rates than defendants.
b. Defendants' concerns about future harm
However, there may be countervailing forces at work that offset
these disparities in stakes perceived by patent holders and asserted
infringers. In some cases, defendants in patent infringement litigation
may perceive that they have more at stake than plaintiff patent
holders.
To some degree, this may be the case in settings where patent
suits are likely to result in injunctions stopping some aspect of the
defendants' activities. " The economic effects of injunctions in
patent litigation tend to be asymmetrical, with more harmful effects
falling on defendants than gains received by plaintiffs. 10' This is
particularly true where a patent holder is a nonpracticing entity and is
seeking an injunction from a producer or seller of a patented item. 106
If the injunction issues, the gain to the patent holder may be a
strengthened bargaining position in patent licensing efforts and,
perhaps, increased licensing revenues, but the losses to the defendant
will be the sum of licensing costs and operational disruption costs
resulting from the injunction. ' Since the operational disruptions
from injunctions unexpectedly stopping a manufacturing or
marketing effort can be substantial, defendants' concerns about these
potential operational disruptions and associated costs may be great
104. See Moore, supra note 15, at 85-86.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. See id. at 85 n.47.
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and significantly outweigh plaintiffs' concerns about possible
enhancements to licensing revenues. Consequently, a defendant
threatened by a disruptive injunction may perceive a much larger
stake in patent litigation than a plaintiff patent holder with only
increased licensing revenues at issue.
Even where the plaintiff in a patent suit is a direct competitor of
the defendant and will capture some of the commercial benefits lost
by the defendant when the latter complies with an injunction, it will
rarely be the case that the plaintiff will gain from an injunction all
that the defendant will lose. For example, assume that the plaintiff
patent holder and the defendant in an infringement case both market
a similar product. If the defendant is suddenly stopped from
continuing to offer its product because it will infringe the plaintiffs
patent, the defendant's customers may simply shift over to buying
the plaintiffs product. However, the costs to the defendant will be
more than just the lost profits the defendant suffers due to its lost
sales. The inability to sell the contested product may leave the
defendant with assets and employee skill sets that were specific to
the production and sales of that product and which are largely useless
if the product cannot be sold. The lost value of these task-specific
assets and resources is an additional cost to the defendant that does
not correspond to a similar gain to the plaintiff. Hence, taking these
types of factors into account, the defendant will perceive that it has a
greater stake in a patent enforcement suit in this type of context than
the plaintiff patent holder.
Another setting in which defendants may perceive that they have
more at stake in patent enforcement litigation than plaintiff patent
holders involves situations where injunctions in patent cases will
disrupt production and marketing plans for both patented and
nonpatented items. "0 A defendant might have an ongoing marketing
plan that would be thrown off track if a key product or service were
not available due to a finding of patent infringement and the issuance
of an associated injunction barring sales. The losses here would
include the costs of the entire failed marketing program rather than
just losses from reduced sales of the infringing item. Additionally, a
defendant might feel that a judgment or lost appeal that branded the
defendant as a patent infringer might have reputational impacts that
108. Id.
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would cause the defendant to incur losses in sales and other adverse
business consequences far beyond the lost sales of the patented item.
A defendant might also have additional sources of revenue (such as
"cargoed sales" of nonpatented goods that tend to be sold with
infringing items) that would be lost if a patent holder obtained an
injunction against the sale of the infringing items. These additional
sources of revenue would give the defendant and plaintiff disparate
stakes in patent litigation potentially leading to this type of
injunction. The revenues from the additional sources would be at risk
for the defendants, but would probably not be within the recoverable
damages influencing the plaintiff s evaluation of the same case.
In these types of circumstances, the perceived harm to a
defendant of a loss in a patent infringement case might be
considerably greater than the potential gain perceived by the plaintiff
in the same case. The selection effects in cases with this type of
imbalance in the perceived interests at stake will mean that
defendants will tend to settle cases that are weak and will only go to
trial and subsequently appeal cases that are relatively strong leading
to higher success rates. This will tend to shift defendants' success
rates at trial and on appeal to rates higher than the 50% success rates
that would otherwise prevail.
2. Countervailing Impacts on Reversal Rates
A wide variety of other factors may cause patent litigants to
make different selection decisions about cases to take to trial and on
to subsequent appeals and thereby shift success rates in favor of one
party. Some of the factors that have been suggested to move patent
case success rates away from 50% rates include asymmetries in
litigation resources, stakes, and information; differences in litigation
risk preferences; concern over adjudicator bias favoring one party
over another; analytical biases in favor of one party predicted by
behavioral science; and repeat-player effects. 1" Additional factors
that commnentators have identified as potentially affecting trial and
appellate success rates generally (although not specifically in patent
cases) include mismeasurements of the likely scope and implications
of potential plaintiff victories, legal standards favoring one side,
settlement implementation costs that are high relative to litigation
109. Id. at 82-83.
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costs, high awards encouraging extensive litigation efforts to gain
small increases in the likelihood of victory, and agency effects
causing the interests of counsel regarding the continuation of
litigation to diverge from the interests of their clients. 110 Other
influences that may cause one party to value the stakes in a case
differently than the other party include (1) information gathering or
analysis capability asymmetries between the parties; "' (2)
fundamental uncertainties of the law (e.g., a case of first impression
in which neither party has a good basis for estimating an
outcome); 112 (3) differences in skills in projecting probable case
results and consequences so as to produce disparate estimates of case
value; " and (4) nonmerit based goals in litigation (e.g., the possible
interest of a litigant in continuing a case to trial or an appeal to gain
attention for a cause rather than to achieve an economically favorable
result in that particular case). 114
The influence of these various factors on case selections in
litigation with claim construction issues is hard, if not impossible, to
measure. It seems likely that several of these factors may apply to
many cases, often in countervailing ways that may cause their effects
on success rates to largely cancel out. Given that appellants' reversal
rates reflect the overall pattern of litigation success in claim
construction cases, only case factors that tend to change reversal
rates in a specific direction and that apply systematically in a
substantial number of cases are likely to move reversal rates
significantly away from the 50% baseline figure predicted by the
basic Priest and Klein model. Factors that apply in a small number of
cases will not influence reversals in enough cases to have an impact
on overall reversal rates. Other factors that affect a substantial
number of cases and that would be expected to have a substantial
impact in pulling reversal rates one way may be counteracted and
cancelled out by equally important and prevalent factors pulling the
rates the other way. Reversal rates will only be shifted substantially
away from the 50% baseline if one or more factors are broadly
110. Kessler, Meites & Miller, supra note 71, at 243-48.
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present and systematically shift appellate rates in one direction in
favor of either patent holders or defendants.
Given the wide diversities of settings, technologies, and parties
involved in patent infringement litigation, it seems unlikely that the
parties' case value assessments are being skewed in a net way up or
down by the sorts of case-specific factors just described. It seems
more likely that these factors are randomly distributed among cases,
with the result that their influence on case selections and success
rates will cancel out when aggregated to measures of overall trial or
appeal success rates over many cases in a substantial period. While
the types of case-specific factors discussed to this point may be
useful in explaining the choices of particular litigants to go forward
with cases or to settle them, in the aggregate of litigation and appeal
processes generally, the above case-specific factors seem likely to be
present in random combinations and to produce equally random
influences on case selections. The resulting effects may, when
combined add up to no net increase or decrease in trial or appellate
success rates. In short, absent some further evidence that particular
factors of the sort discussed here dominate a wide variety of patent
cases, these case-specific factors probably provide little or no basis
to estimate changes in trial or appeal success rates away from the
50% rate predicted by Priest and Klein.
3. Endowment Effects Producing Higher Estimates of Case Value
There is, however, one factor present across diverse patent cases
that may account for a shift in patent case success rates within the
Priest and Klein model: litigants dislike giving up what they already
have. This factor-referred to generally as an "endowment effect" in
behavioral economics literature "'-causes parties to value one dollar
to be given up greater than one dollar to be gained. "6 In the context
115. See generally Richard Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, I J. OF
ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 39, 43-47 (1980) (discussing the economic concept of opportunity cost
and the behavioral hypothesis of the endowment effect). For a summary of some of the literature
on endowment effects and analyses of the possible sources of these effects, see Elizabeth
Hoffman & Matthew L. Spitzer, Willingness to Pay vs. Willingness to Accept: Legal and
Economic Implications, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 59 (1993).
116. Another term for this phenomenon is "divestiture aversion," a reference to the
underlying aversion to losing an asset already possessed. See Jack L. Knetsch, Fang-Fang Tang &
Richard H. Thaler, The Endowment Effect and Repeated Market Trials: Is the Vickrey Auction
Demand Revealing?, 4 EXPERIMENTAL ECON. 257, 257 (2001) ("People commonly value losses
much more than commensurate gains . . . ").
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of patent litigation, this tendency to overvalue settled expectations
about asset ownership or other rights should cause parties who have
assets or long-standing expectations of continuing existing conduct
to value these more than plaintiffs who stand to gain equivalent
amounts or conduct advantages if they win in patent litigation.
a. Endowment effect in patent trials
In the context of patent litigation, defendants may feel that they
have more to lose and more at stake than plaintiffs because the
defendants will be forced to divest themselves of assets (or to give up
expected conduct normally resulting in assets) if they lose in the
litigation and are subject to damages awards or injunctive relief.
While defendants may not actually have more dollars at stake than
plaintiffs in patent cases where damages are at the heart of the cases,
defendants will perceive that they have more at stake due to
endowment effects and will act accordingly in settling cases. Based
on behavioral preferences for keeping assets over obtaining them,
defendants' decision making under the influence of endowment
effects will be equivalent to the thinking of purely rational decision
makers who really have more at stake in cases than plaintiff patent
holders. This impact of endowment effects should tend to influence
all patent litigation, meaning that defendants will tend to perceive
that they have more at stake in patent litigation than plaintiffs and
trial success rates will tend to shift to rates favoring defendants.
Because trial success rates are frequently reported in terms of success
by plaintiffs, this shift toward rates favoring defendants will mean
that plaintiffs' success rates should be somewhat less than 50% in
patent cases. Thus, consideration of endowment effects within the
construct of Priest and Klein's case selection theory leads to a
prediction of trial success rates favoring defendants-that is, trial
success rates for plaintiffs in patent suits of well below 50%.
b. Endowment effect in patent appeals
Endowment effects may have a somewhat different impact on
reversal rates in patent appeals. In the instance of cases appealed to
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the party with an
endowed expectation-that is, the party who feels that she
"possesses" an asset-will be the party who has prevailed at trial.
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When an appeal is launched, it is by the party who is dissatisfied
with the district court's result. The opposing party-that is, the party
who prevailed on claim construction issues at trial-has a clear
interest and expectation in the economic value of her trial result.
Endowment effects will cause the party prevailing at trial to perceive
that she has a greater stake in keeping the benefits of her win at trial
than her opponent will have in taking back those benefits. This
means that parties prevailing at trial will-due to the irrationality of
endowment effects-systematically feel that they have more to lose
in an appeal than their opponents will feel that they have to gain.
In the context of claim construction appeals, this means that a
patent holder who prevailed in obtaining a broad claim construction
at trial and who was able to establish infringement accordingly will
have a strong interest and expectation in keeping the damage
recovery that this result promised. He will perceive a greater interest
in keeping this probable recovery promised by the district court
result than the interest his opponent will perceive in taking the
recovery away through a successful appeal. Hence, where a patent
holder has prevailed on claim construction grounds at trial,
endowment effects will tend to cause the patent holder to perceive
his stake in an appeal as being greater than the stake perceived by his
opponent. Consequently, selection theory predicts that where patent
holders prevail on claim construction grounds at trial, resulting
reversal rates on claim construction grounds will favor the patent
holders and that the Federal Circuit will overturn pro-plaintiff claim
constructions far less than 50% of the time.
The analysis of cases in which accused infringers prevail at trial
is essentially the same. A defendant who has prevailed at trial by
obtaining either a narrow claim construction-which precludes a
showing of infringement-or a broad claim construction that causes
the patent at issue to be invalid for lack of novelty or nonobviousness
will have a strong interest and expectation of keeping the liability-
avoiding benefits of this ruling. She will feel that her stake in
keeping these benefits and in keeping the assets the patent holder
would acquire if liability were found is more substantial than her
opponent will feel is his stake in acquiring the defendant's assets
through a successful appeal. Hence, in this type of case, endowment
effects will cause a successful defendant to perceive the greater
interest at stake in an appeal and cause the predicted reversal rate to
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shift in favor of the defendants. This means that appellate reversal
rates should favor defendants (that is, be well below 50% levels) in
cases where the defendants prevailed at trial on claim construction
issues and the patent holders in the cases are challenging these claim
constructions on appeal.
Thus, the winner at trial-regardless of whether that party is the
plaintiff or the defendant-will perceive that he has more at stake in
continuing a case involving claim construction issues through an
appeal than will his opponent, even if the dollar value of the case to
the two parties is objectively equal and each side, from a rational
viewpoint, has the same amount under contention in the appeal.
Under this logic, endowment effects influencing the judgments of
prevailing parties at trial will tend to cause these prevailing parties to
see more at stake in appeals than losing parties at trial, meaning that
reversal rates on appeal (which effectively measure when winners at
trial lose on appeal) should tend to be somewhat less than 50%,
taking into account Priest and Klein's model of appellate case
selection.
At the same time, since they are equally subject to these
endowment effects and corresponding shifts in case value
perceptions away from purely rational assessments, both plaintiff and
defendant victors at trial should be equally subject to endowment
effects when deciding on how vigorously to litigate appeals. That is
to say, both types of victors will have similarly inflated senses of
case values and of what is at stake on appeal when they have won in
trial courts below. This means that plaintiffs and defendants in patent
cases will each tend to overvalue their cases on appeal when they are
winners in the litigation below. This, in turn, suggests that the
success rates for plaintiffs and defendants on appeal would be
predicted under Priest and Klein's appellate case selection model to
shift equally upward in favor of whoever was the victor in the trial
below.
Following an assessment in the next section of the scope of case
filtering processes influencing the characteristics of claim
construction issues in appealed patent cases, the accuracy of the
above predictions of appellate reversal rates for claim construction
cases are evaluated in Part V of this Article.
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IV. THE EXTENT OF PATENT CASE FILTERING AND THE NARROW
SLICE OF PATENT CASES RESULTING IN FEDERAL CIRCUIT APPEALS
Past studies of patent litigation confirm that cases resulting in
appellate decisions and contributing to district court reversal rates
reflect a very small percentage of all patent enforcement disputes. "
The universe of patent enforcement efforts and potential disputes
includes all instances where a patent holder perceives potential
infringement and seeks damages or a change of conduct from an
asserted infringer by some means. This broad set of patent disputes is
greatly filtered by decisions of the disputants about whether to file
cases, whether to pursue such cases to trial, whether to continue trial
proceedings to a trial result, and whether to seek to overturn the trial
result through a further appeal. 1 These decisions shape the narrow
stream of cases that reach the Federal Circuit and that form the basis
for Federal Circuit reversal rates.
Actions that a patent holder may take against a perceived
infringer extend from taking informal steps demanding cessation of
infringement, to filing a patent enforcement action, to completing a
trial of the matter, to pursuing a subsequent appeal. "' Most cases of
perceived patent infringement proceed very little down this path. 120
Decisions at early stages (at least prior to the completion of a patent
trial) will typically resolve most infringement disputes.121 These
early-stage decisions shape the workload of the Federal Circuit in
important ways by only allowing a narrow set of cases to proceed all
the way to a Federal Circuit result.
117. If 11.7% of patent cases are fully litigated to a trial result, and 67% to 73% of those
cases are appealed, then the 34.5% reversal rate at the appellate level translates to at most a 3%
reversal rate of all filed patent cases. See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., PATENT CLAIM CONSTRUCTION: A
SURVEY OF FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT JUDGES 23 (2008), http://www.fjc.gov/public/
pdf.nsf/lookup/patclaim.pdf/$file/patclaim.pdf; Moore, supra note 2, at 236; UNIV. OF HOUSTON
LAW CTR., supra note 4 (showing that 88.3% of patent cases are settled); see also Priest & Klein,
supra note 20, at 6-7.
118. See supra Part III.D.3.
119. See generally Priest & Klein, supra note 20, at 6-7.
120. See Kesan & Ball, supra note 95, at 258-59 (noting that 80% of patent cases settle under




CLAIM CONSTRUCTION REVERSAL RATES
A. Pretrial Settlement ofPatent Disputes
At early stages, efforts to enforce a patent may be settled (and
thereby eliminated from the enforcement process even before a case
is filed) in response to pretrial patent enforcement steps leading to a
patent license, an agreement not to undertake further infringing
conduct, or other settlement terms. 122 Patent holders, upon
discovering apparent patent infringement, commonly send a demand
letter to the asserted infringer pointing out the suspected
infringement and demanding that it cease.123 In some cases, this will
resolve the matter and no case will be filed. The resolution reached
in this way may involve assurances of no further repetitions of the
assertedly infringing conduct or, more commonly, a negotiated
license and royalty payment settling claims for past infringement and
permitting continuation of the assertedly infringing conduct subject
to the payment of associated license fees.
The transmittal of a demand letter to an asserted infringer is a
common preliminary enforcement step, both because it may resolve a
case of patent infringement without the expense of patent litigation
and because, by putting a potential infringer on clear notice of a
particular patent and the grounds for believing that the party's actual
or contemplated conduct is likely infringing, a demand letter can
help to establish that subsequent infringement is willful and a proper
basis for punitive damages. 124 The receipt of such a letter, coupled
with the information that it conveys to the recipient about probable
infringement in future conduct, will make it harder (but not
necessarily impossible) for the recipient to assert successfully that
she had a good-faith basis to believe that the conduct was non-
infringing (and, therefore, that the conduct did not involve willful
infringement) if she nonetheless goes forward with the conduct
despite the demand letter.
The fraction of perceived patent disputes that are resolved
without litigation is difficult to measure. At two opposite extremes-
where either a patent holder or an asserted infringer does not care
greatly about the assertedly infringing conduct-a perceived instance
122. ALLAN J. STERNSTEIN, ET AL., CORPORATE COMPLIANCE SERIES: INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY § 3:98 (2009).
123. DON W. MARTENS & JOHN B. SGANGA, JR., PRE-LITIGATION PATENT ENFORCEMENT
§ 3:1 (2009).
124. See 60 AM. JUR. 2D Patents § 960 (2009).
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of patent infringement may be resolved without much effort or
concern among the respective parties. If a patent holder feels that he
has little to gain from enforcement, he may simply ignore perceived
infringement (or do little more than send a threatening demand letter
with no further follow up). If an asserted infringer has rarely
undertaken the infringing conduct raised as a concern by a patent
holder and has little or no strategic reason in undertaking that
conduct in the future, then the asserted infringer may just avoid
future instances of that conduct and even agree to avoid the conduct
in the future in order to reassure the patent holder that he need not
take any further enforcement steps. In these circumstances, the
parties involved may not spend much time on claim construction as
there is so little at stake in patent enforcement that it is not worth the
effort and expense of clarifying the relevant claims interpretation.
Where more is at stake, the parties to a patent enforcement
dispute may still resolve a threatened case short of litigation. "' This
will tend to be the case where the patent holder and the asserted
infringer see the relevant case and case value (as measured by either
damages for the patent holder or the costs of altered conduct to the
asserted infringer) in similar terms and can therefore agree upon a
settlement value for the case. While identical valuations need not be
reached, the value of the case perceived by each side must be close
enough that neither feels that the cost of litigation (including the
often considerable costs of discovery and other case preparation
steps) is worth expending to bring the case value in a completed trial
up from the proposed settlement amount (in the analysis of the patent
holder) or down from the proposed settlement amount (in the
analysis of the asserted infringer). Thus, settled cases reflect some
shared and roughly similar visions of case value on both sides,
125. Skilled counsel can often aid clients in predicting patent enforcement results at trial and
in structuring case settlement terms accordingly. As noted by two analysts of civil litigation
generally:
[I]n civil cases, lawyers and their clients carefully size up their cases and attendant
circumstances (e.g., judge or jury ideology) and settle those where the parties' outcome
expectations are clear and convergent and take to trial those that are not. Once in court,
experienced litigators might tell you, the outcomes of these latter, indeterminate cases
are often a toss up. Indeed, a trial lawyer's financial success may turn on the old axiom
of knowing "when to hold them and when to fold them" in sorting out cases for
settlement or adjudication.
Yates & Coggins, supra note 71, at 267.
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including some roughly similar visions of claim scope to the extent
that such scope affects case value.
This is not to say that every settled patent case indicates that the
claims were clear in the patent at issue. A vague term may just not
affect the outcome of a particular patent dispute. For example, a
claim term that has a clear central meaning and some vagueness
about its boundaries will not lead to a difference in interpretation
among the parties to a patent dispute if both parties see the conduct
of the asserted infringer as falling within the clear portion of the
claim term. The ambiguity of claims language would still be there,
but it would not be material to assessing the impact of the claims and
would not impair the two parties from reaching similar estimates of
patent case value that would support a settlement.
The number of cases of threatened patent enforcement litigation
that are resolved in this matter without filed litigation is probably
substantial. Logically, a broad range of patent disputes should fall
into this threatened but unfiled case category. The American
Intellectual Property Law Association has estimated that the average
cost of preparing a patent case to the completion of the discovery
phase (but not through the end of the related trial) is approximately
$5,000,000 for a high-damages case. 126
This suggests why a large fraction of contemplated patent
infringement disputes may settle before a patent lawsuit is even filed.
If potential patent litigants believe that they will have a large
damages case of average complexity and cost, patent holders and
asserted infringers will be motivated to settle their case if they can
come within $5,000,000 in their respective case valuations and
settlement figures. The reason is that both parties will see more merit
in settlement than in proceeding to trial if the two parties have
visions of case value that are within this $5,000,000 range or window
of opportunity.
The two parties will have essentially symmetrical case
valuations that will tend to lead them to this result. Assume that the
estimated $5,000,000 case preparation costs are roughly equally split
between the parties, meaning that each faces about $2,500,000 in
case development costs through the discovery phase. A rational
126. AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS'N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 2007, at 25
(2007). But cf Moore, supra note 15, at 94-95 (noting that the average cost for each litigant
taking an average patent case to trial is $2,000,000).
Spring 2010] 1027
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW [Vol. 43:981
plaintiff in this type of high-damages patent litigation would be
willing to settle the case at any point prior to case preparation for a
figure that is anywhere within $2,500,000 below the plaintiffs
estimate of the probable recovery in the case, taking into account his
likelihood of winning and scope of recoverable damages. Because
the transaction costs of preparing the case (much less trying it) will
eat up approximately $2,500,000 of the recovered amount if case
preparation is needed, the plaintiff will be better off settling for an
amount that is less than the plaintiffs estimated case value figure, so
long as the settlement amount is not more than $2,500,000 below
that estimate. The analysis for the rational defendant is identical, but
in the opposite direction. That is, a rational defendant will find merit
in any case settlement at an early case stage that spares the defendant
case preparation costs and that is no more than $2,500,000 higher
than the defendant's best estimate of case value. Such a settlement
will still be better for the defendant than sticking it out to trial and
obtaining a result closer to the defendant's estimated case value
while expending the $2,500,000 cost of litigation to produce this
result.
Under this type of analysis, the very high costs of preparing
patent cases may tend to drive potential patent litigants to settlements
in a high percentage of cases. The range between the estimates of
case value of the potential plaintiffs and defendants in patent cases
that will support settlements is particularly large because of the
unusually large costs of preparing and trying patent cases. 127 In
essence, the costs of preparing and litigating a patent case are a clear
deterrent to proceeding to trial and a strong incentive for the parties
to consider a broader range of economic settlements than might be
the case if the trial option were less costly. While strategic behavior
that causes one or more of the parties to turn away from an
economically advantageous settlement may preclude the type of
agreements on settlements described here, in most cases economic
desirability will probably be persuasive and settlements will result if
the parties view case values approximately the same way and reach
approximately the same estimates. 128
127. See Priest & Klein, supra note 20, at 25.
128. See id. at 26-28.
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The extreme costs of patent litigation will drive many potential
litigants toward case settlements, making the sufficiency of patent
claim construction standards and other patent law criteria to produce
similar case evaluations by potential litigants an arguably more
important criterion for measuring the sufficiency of such standards
than appellate reversal rates. Reversal rates must be viewed as
measuring only the Federal Circuit's views on a select set of cases
that survive the strong pressures to settle before and during trials, a
set of cases that the litigants, despite the considerable sums that they
may have spent on case preparations and trials, still see differently
and are unwilling to settle prior to completed appeals.
B. Filed Patent Cases
Where more informal steps like demand letters and associated
negotiations do not result in an acceptable settlement, a patent holder
may proceed on to file a patent enforcement action. At this point, the
course of patent enforcement steps and resolutions becomes much
more measureable. We know that by far the majority of patent suits
are resolved through settlements, not litigation. 129 For example,
according to analyses by researchers at the University of Houston
Law Center, the Federal Judicial Center Integrated Database
indicates that 2,120 patent cases were resolved in 2008. 130 Of these
dispositions, 88.3% or 1,872 cases were resolved without a court
decision (that is, with either a settlement and dismissal (82.5%) or a
consent judgment (5.8%)). ' Only 248 patent cases nationwide were
resolved through completed court cases 112 potentially leading to a
Federal Circuit appeal (and, therefore, potentially affecting the
Federal Circuit's reversal rates). Of the 248 cases actually resolved
through completed litigation, most were resolved through summary
judgments as shown in the following adjudication breakdown (all
percentages reflect fractions of the total 2,120 patent cases resolved
in 2008) '":
129. Kesan & Ball, supra note 95, at 272.
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ADJUDICATION BREAKDOWN
Adjudicated Resolutions No. of Cases Percent of Cases
Summary Judgment 184 8.7%
Jury Verdict 59 2.8%
Bench Trial 1 0.05%
Judgment as a Matter of Law 4 0.19%
Total Adjudicated 248 11.7%
Only adjudicated cases have potential influences on Federal
Circuit reversal rates. These are cases that the parties viewed very
differently through the trial stage such that the substantial cost of a
completed trial was seen as worthwhile. As discussed below, not all
of these adjudicated cases are appealed, further reducing the portion
of litigated cases that influences the Federal Circuit's reversal rates.
Conversely, parties to patent suits reached sufficiently common
analyses in 88.3% of cases to conclude settlement agreements (or to
at least jointly accept a voluntary cessation of the litigation even if no
formal agreement was reached). 134 This suggests that claims
interpretations (and other aspects of the case analyses affecting case
values) were similarly evaluated by the parties, leading to
sufficiently parallel analyses to support settlement agreements.
The recent figures accumulated by University of Houston Law
Center researchers showing a high percentage of settled patent cases
are consistent with Moore's findings regarding earlier levels of
settlements in patent cases resolved from 1995 to 1999.'3 Moore
found that 76% of all patent cases resolved during this period were
settled after the filing of the cases but before the conclusion of
district court proceedings. 136 Moore identified the stages at which
cases were settled as follows (percentages are based on the 6,007
patent cases settled between 1995 and 1999) '":
134. See id.
135. See id.; Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice
Affect Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 889, 913 (2001).
136. Moore, supra note 135, at 913.
137. Id. at 913 tbl.6.
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STAGES AT WHICH PATENT CASES SETTLE
Process Stage Percent of Settled Cases
Before Any Court Action 34%
Mid-Litigation 51%
After Pre-Trial Conference 14%
During or After Trial 1%
Moore's findings further support the notion that settlements in
patent cases reflect the growing understanding of cases by the
litigants over the course of case preparation, which increases the
likelihood of settlement as the parties come to a joint view of case
value and can reach a settlement agreement accordingly. Indeed, the
above case progress breakdowns for settlements suggest that much of
the learning of the parties about probable case results and associated
successful negotiations of settlements occurs during the discovery
and pretrial preparation for cases, with little further information
prompting additional settlements arising at trial.
In yet another study using different sources of information on
patent case resolutions, Jay P. Kesan and Gwendolyn G. Ball found
very similar case settlement rates to those identified by Moore. 1'
Kesan and Ball used data on case resolutions accumulated by the
Administrative Office for the U.S. Courts, '" supplemented by case
docket reports for individual cases. 140 They focused on patent cases
originating in three specific years-1995, 1997, and 2000-and
tracked the resolution of those cases. 141 Their study focused on how
many of these cases were resolved through settlements, as well as on
estimates of the litigation expense needed to reach these case
settlements. 142 Like Moore, Kesan and Ball found that only about 5%
of filed patent cases result in completed trials. "' They emphasized
138. See id. at 913; Kesan & Ball, supra note 95, at 272 (finding that most patent cases settle).
139. Kesan & Ball, supra note 95, at 260.
140. Id. at 266.
141. Id
142. Id. at 266, 280-81.
143. Id. at 311.
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that a substantial number of additional patent cases are adjudicated
on the merits through summary judgments. '" These cases make up
about 6% to 9% of resolved cases. 1' Thus, using Kesan and Ball's
highest figures, only about 5% plus 9% (or 14%) of filed patent cases
resulted in district court adjudications in the years covered by their
study and were candidates for Federal Circuit appeals. Even
assuming, in the most extreme view, that all adjudicated cases were
appealed, this means that Federal Circuit reversal rates are still based
on no more than 14% of all filed patent cases. This illustrates
concretely what a small portion of patent cases are reflected in
Federal Circuit analyses.
Even taking Kesan and Ball's most generous estimate of
summary judgment rates-that is, 9% of filed cases-settlements or
voluntary case withdrawals accounted for 86% of patent case
resolutions. 146 Kesan and Ball recognized the importance of
settlements in the resolution of patent cases and attempted to break
down the duration to resolution of patent cases in their study to
assess how quickly cases tended to be resolved. 147 While their
interest in time to resolution was in using this time as a rough
measure of case preparation expense, 148 the same duration to
resolution figures can also be taken as measures of degrees of case
information gathering and ongoing reassessment by the litigants.
Cases that settle long after suit filing will, on average, tend to reflect
more discovery and analyses by the litigants than cases that settle
soon after suit filing. 149 As suit preparation processes go forward, the
similarity of the analyses of the parties will tend to increase, if for no
other reason than that the expectations of each party that there are
unknown material facts out there as yet unfound (or that will be
144. Id.
145. Id. Further portions of Kesan and Ball's study confirm that summary judgment results in
patent cases are often obtained following the investment of trial preparation and initiation
resources that are similar to those expended on fully completed trials. Id. at 298-300. In
connection with claim construction issues, this suggests that summary judgment decisions and
trial court results may be based on similar fact finding and information sets. This also suggests
that settlements at these same stages will be similarly informed and tend to filter out similar types
of cases seen in like terms by the opposing litigants.
146. This 86% figure equals the percentage of all resolutions (100%) less the percentages
resolved by trials (5%) and by summary judgments (9% using Kesan and Ball's largest estimate).
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found within the time and resources available before trial) becomes
less and less and the associated analysis uncertainties (or at least
intra-party differences) decrease. In short, whether they are actually
increasingly confident that they know all the relevant facts or are
simply realists operating under the assumption that they must work
with the facts that they have because discovery is winding down and
a trial date is looming, parties will tend to converge their factual
bases for analysis and, hence, their case value assessments, with the
progress of discovery and pretrial preparation of patent cases.
Kesan and Ball found remarkably similar settlement timing
patterns over the years that they studied. The average times to
resolution for cases filed in 1995, 1997, and 2000 were 418, 466, and
443 days respectively. "o The median times to resolution-arguably
better measures of typical case duration because they are less
influenced by a few aberrant cases-were 298, 299, and 295 days for
1995, 1997, and 2000, respectively. "' The timing breakdowns found
for settlements of patent cases were as follows: 152
150. Id. at 281-82.
15 1. Id.
152. See id. at 282 tbl. 11. The cumulative percentage figures for more than eight quarters
(which represent the percentages for all case resolutions) differ from 100% due to rounding
effects in the prior figures in this table.
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The settlement timing characteristics reflected in this table
indicate that a large fraction of cases are settled relatively soon after
filing. 1' The majority of cases were found by their parties to have
similarly consistent case value estimates formed within one year of
case filing such that the parties were able to agree on settlement
terms and to resolve the cases in this period. 15 Indeed, parties' joint
learning about their cases and reevaluation of their positions seems to
be quite active from the outset of filed cases, with substantial
fractions of case settlements occurring from the first through fifth
quarters after case filing.
From these case resolution figures-and several other measures
of case expenditures that they develop and analyze-Kesan and Ball
conclude that, contrary to accepted wisdom, many patent cases do
not require the expenditure of tremendous resources for resolution
because the great bulk of cases are resolved through settlements
reached at relatively early stages of case preparation. 1' This
conclusion focusing on resource allocations seems sound. However,
the same data support the view that the litigants are frequently able to
work within present patent standards-including claim construction
standards-and reach conceptualizations and valuations of their case
relatively early in case preparation. 1' By acting during early case
stages, patent litigants are able to find overlaps in their estimations of
case value and reach settlement terms accordingly. Thus, whether
they are analyzed in terms of the common information sets and
overlapping valuations of the parties that supported their settlements
or in terms of the amount of resources that the litigants probably
expended to reach the point of agreements, Kesan and Ball's findings
provide substantial support for the view that present patent standards
provide ample clarity for parties to patent disputes to reach similar
case views with alacrity and to achieve relatively prompt case
settlements. 1'
The predominance of settled cases over cases going to trial
suggests that present claims interpretation standards may, contrary to
153. Id.
154. See id.
155. See id. at 288-98.
156. See id. at 262.
157. See id. at 272.
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the view of their critics, "' be sufficiently clear to support practically
clear and predictable claims interpretations in most cases. If this
were not the case and parties to patent disputes (as aided by their
attorneys) were unable to reach similar claims interpretations, it
seems unlikely that the high percentage of observed case settlements
in this field would be reached. Put simply, if the parties to a case had
significantly different claims interpretations (or projected
significantly different claims interpretations by the district court
likely to hear the case), it is doubtful that the parties would produce
similar case value estimates. Claims interpretations are so
fundamental to establishing a basis for patent scope and patent
enforcement value that it is hard to understand how the parties to a
dispute would reach similar case value estimates and agree to case
settlements unless the two parties reached parallel and similar
conclusions about claims scope (at least in areas material to the
litigation) as part of their analyses leading to their settlement
agreements. Hence, the prevalence of agreed-to settlements in 86%
of resolved patent cases is substantial evidence that most parties
approaching patent claims interpretation and case valuations do have
similar approaches to claims interpretation and associated estimates
of patent infringement scope and case values. "
Conversely, the perceived need of the litigants to move forward
with trials in a small but meaningful fraction of cases (11.7% of all
filed patent cases in the University of Houston's study; 11% to 16%
in Kesan and Ball's study) 160 indicates that there are some cases
where there remain (even after discovery steps and associated
analyses) substantial differences about some aspects of these patent
disputes that preclude the parties from reaching agreements about
case values and establishing settlements. However, the presence of
some sources of uncertainty in these instances does not necessarily
mean that the claims involved were the sources of uncertainty. In
many instances, for example, questions about patent validity may
have been seen differently by the parties, leading to a willingness to
go forward with litigation to resolve this difference in perceived case
characteristics. The claims in these cases may have been relatively
158. See Chu, supra note 25, at 1078-79; Craig Allen Nard, A Theory of Claim
Interpretation, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 82 (2000).
159. See supra text accompanying note 142.
160. Kesan & Ball, supra note 95, at 271; UNIV. OF HOUSTON LAW CTR., supra note 4.
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clear and similarly analyzed by the parties, but the litigants may have
proceeded with the litigation due to other sources of uncertainty and
settlement failure. Thus, the fraction of all cases in which uncertain
patent claims preclude similar case valuations and settlements by
disputants may actually be far less than the 11.7% of cases that lead
to completed litigation rather than case settlements.
Further evidence of patent case resolutions during trials
additionally supports the notion that, as claim construction
uncertainty is reduced and the corresponding estimates of case value
reached by the litigants become more similar, patent cases are more
and more likely to settle. 161 One survey found that 29% of patent
cases reaching trial settle after claim constructions are specified by a
district court. 162 This suggests that the district court's claim
construction result becomes a common point of reference from
which both parties can project their respective estimates of case
success and case value. The district court result pulls together many
estimates that might previously have been disparate because they
turned on different expectations about what claim construction would
control in the case.
Cases that settle following a district court claim construction
remove more cases with low claim construction uncertainty from the
flow of cases to the Federal Circuit. These settled cases are ones with
claim constructions with sufficiently low uncertainty that litigants
feel the district court and the Federal Circuit claim constructions will
be about the same such that an appeal will not be a worthwhile
means to produce a different result. Given this further case filtering
based on district court claim constructions and related settlements,
only the cases in which claim constructions are the most uncertain
are likely to proceed further to challenges to claim constructions in
Federal Circuit appeals.
In his separate comments contained in this symposium issue,
Professor Sichelman makes the point that "the high cost of litigation
relative to the maximum amount at stake is the major driver of most
settlements" and notes that seasoned litigator Joseph Re agrees with
161. See 1999 ABA Section of Intellectual Property Law, 1999 Markman Survey, 18 A.B.A.
SEC. PUB. I.P.L. 12 (2000).
162. Id. at 15.
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this point. 6 However, Sichelman incorrectly contends that I
disagree with this view. 1" My contention, as noted in this Article
and in agreement with many leading scholars who have studied case
settlements, is that patent enforcement cases settle when the parties
have estimates of probable case outcomes that differ by no more than
the costs of further litigation such that it is no longer worth
continuing the litigation. 165 Thus, naturally, as the costs of litigation
relative to the amounts still at stake go up, the range of differences in
outcome estimates within which the parties will see settlement rather
than continued litigation as desirable will expand and the likelihood
of settlements will go up. We are all in agreement on this point. 166
The high rates of patent case settlements result within this set of
criteria for settlement.
However, Sichelman focuses too much on "the high costs of
litigation" in his analysis and not on "the maximum amount at
stake." " High litigation costs are not the only force in play here. 16
Litigation costs for patent cases are large because the stakes are even
larger. 169 The large amounts at stake in many patent cases suggest
that the parties might often be very far apart in dollar amounts in
their respective estimates of case value were they to adopt even
modestly different approaches to key case issues like claim
construction. High error rates in patent case estimates that tend to
frustrate settlements are accompanied by high litigation costs that
tend to promote settlements. These two effects will somewhat offset
each other, meaning that high litigation costs for patent cases are
unlikely to make these cases exceptions to the general tendency of
cases to settle as the gaps between case value estimates shrink. While
these estimates may never actually match in cases that are settled-
and one or more sides may only grudgingly adopt their estimate, not
out of actual "agreement" with the estimate but rather as a means to
163. Ted Sichelman, Myths of (Un)Certainty at the Federal Circuit, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
1161, 1165 (2010).
164. Id.
165. See supra Part IV.A.
166. Sichelman, supra note 163, at 1165 n.13.
167. Id. at 1165 (emphasis added).
168. See id.
169. Christopher A. Harkins, Fending Off Paper Patents and Patent Trolls: A Novel "Cold
Fusion" Defense Because Changing Times Demand It, 17 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 407, 434
(2007).
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predict whether further litigation is likely to achieve anything of net
value in light of further litigation costs-alignment of case value
estimates, in conjunction with the costs of litigation, seem likely to
be determinants of case settlements at every stage of litigation.
Claim construction standards such as those set by the Federal
Circuit are, along with other patent law standards, part of the
framework within which litigants determine "the amounts at stake"
in further litigation. 1' These are not the total amounts claimed as
damages for infringement, but rather the amounts of increased or
decreased liability (or probable liability) that further litigation will
influence. 17 Even if litigation costs suggest that some disparity in
estimates will still be good enough to produce a settlement, the
parties still must bring their estimates within a close enough range to
produce joint agreement on a settlement after taking projected
litigation costs for remaining portions of the case into account. Claim
construction standards have a key and largely successful role in
guiding the case value estimates of disputing parties to sufficiently
similar levels to produce settlements. 172 Even in cases that are settled
for the "nuisance value" of avoiding litigation on some issues-that
is, because the amounts to be gained from further contention of those
issues are not worth the costs of the further contention-will often
have an underlying core of probable liability as estimated from claim
construction and other patent standards that justifies a substantial
settlement. 1' Absent this core, plaintiffs would tend not to mount
expensive patent cases and defendants would not settle for fear of
being seen as soft touches. The large amounts claimed in many
patent cases and the potential, in light of these large amounts
claimed, for even small differences in claim constructions and
liability probability assessments to produce substantial disparities in
case value estimates by opposing parties in patent cases would tend
to keep the parties apart in settlement discussions. The fact that the
vast majority of patent cases settle despite these forces tending to
170. See Kelly Casey Mullally, Patent Hermeneutics: Form and Substance in Claim
Construction, 59 FLA. L. REv. 333, 337 (2007).
171. See Note, Exposing the Extortion Gap: An Economic Analysis of the Rules of Collateral
Estoppel, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1940, 1947 (1992).
172. See Mark A. Lemley, The Changing Meaning ofPatent Claim Terms, 104 MICH. L. REV.
101, 102 (2005).
173. See supra Part III.D.1.
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keep parties apart is a testament to the success of claim construction
standards and other patent law standards in guiding case value
estimates and producing roughly similar estimates among opposing
litigants that lead to settlements.
In his discussions of my analysis on this point, Sichelman notes
in his article that "the median damages award in patent cases in jury
trials is about $3 million and only $500,000 in bench trials" and then
seems to argue that this indicates the stakes in patent cases are lower
than the amounts the parties are willing to spend on litigation. 174 This
analysis may understate the dollar amounts that are claimed in patent
cases because the amounts Sichelman cites reflect only those awards
in cases that resulted in concluded trials and ignore amounts paid in
settlements. ' In addition, the real amounts at stake in patent cases
(for both parties) may be far more than the damages at issue in those
cases. Patent holders will often be worried about the future
enforcement of their patents, "6 while defendants will often be
worried about the potential for business interruption losses that are
not reflected in damage recoveries at stake in present cases. 1' These
will define the amounts seen at issue in particular cases, not just the
potential damage recovery amounts under contest in those cases.
Sichelman attempts to roughly estimate these further amounts at
issue in patent cases as being approximately equal to the amounts
seen in case recoveries, '" but I see no reason why this relationship
should hold and question whether this is a complete estimate of
overall case value. 179
The amounts at issue in cases (or the "maximum amount at
stake," as Sichelman labels them 1so) are not, as Sichelman seems to
suggest, single, static numbers for particular cases, "' but rather
changing amounts that evolve as the legal issues in the cases are
resolved and the parties gain greater knowledge about the material
facts of the cases. The amounts in dispute at any particular time in a
174. See Sichelman, supra note 163, at 1166.
175. See id. at 1164 n.17 (citing the amount of damages awarded in jury and bench trials).
176. See supra Part III.D. .a.
177. See supra Part III.D.1.b.
178. Sichelman, supra note 163, at 1166.
179. Contra id.
180. Id. at 1165.
181. See id. at 1165 n.13.
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case are the incremental gains to the plaintiff (taking into account all
implications of the case) that further litigation may produce and the
reduced losses to the defendant (again taking into account all
implications of the case) that further litigation may avoid.
Taking these broader amounts into account, rational litigants
will only continue forward with litigation rather than settling a case
where they perceive that the amounts that they will gain by
continuing forward will exceed the costs of continuing forward. I,
and other analysts of settlement behavior, only contend that, at each
stage of litigation, parties continue in a rational manner because they
see the amounts subject to influence in further litigation steps
(including the values of the broader implications of their cases
beyond just the damage recoveries at issue) as being more substantial
than the costs of the additional litigation steps. 182 If Sichelman is
arguing that litigants do not tend to pursue this type of rational
behavior (which is no more than good business behavior, as is likely
to be followed by the corporate counsel and business executives who
control most large patent cases), then he should be clear on this
point. '
Admittedly, the estimates of case outcomes and economic
implications of those outcomes for clients that are available for
consideration in litigation decisions are all very rough, but they are
the best that parties have to work with if they are to conduct
litigation rationally in pursuit of their best economic interests.
Sichelman seems to suggest that other forces will be at work to
determine when cases settle. 184 Yet the examples he cites-adverse
claim construction or summary judgment rulings as tending to ensure
quick settlements-are cases in point where the rulings constrain the
subsequent arguments that are likely to be successful for one or both
sides, thereby narrowing the liability amounts that at least one party
can expect to influence through later litigation. Such rulings will tend
to bring the parties' analyses together and produce a settlement. ' I
agree with Sichelman and the experienced litigator he cites that
182. See, e.g., Priest & Klein, supra note 20, at 12-13.
183. See Sichelman, supra note 163, at 1165 n.13.
184. See id. at 1168-70 (discussing the effects of claim construction, summary judgment, and
forum shopping on parties' decisions to settle).
185. See id. at 1168-69.
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clients will tend to settle in these circumstances. 1' Clients will tend
to settle because it would be irrational for them to waste their money
by continuing litigation where the probable costs of further litigation
exceed the expected gains to be realized, taking into account their
counsels' best estimates of probable results and all the probable
future implications of the results for the clients. 181 Of course, clients
may act irrationally in these circumstances for a number of
reasons. 188 However, absent an account of systematic irrationality in
this area, it seems fair to assume, as I have done in my analysis, that
rationality generally prevails and that settlements mostly reflect
decisions by the parties (based on their respective assessments of
case outcomes to be influenced by further litigation) that additional
litigation has no net projected benefits over the terms of the
settlements under consideration such that the cases at hand should be
terminated in both parties' perceived net interests.
Sichelman notes further the possible impacts of either forum
selection or Federal Circuit panel differences in determining patent
case outcomes. ' What he fails to include in his analysis is that these
differences are themselves probably the result of case selection
effects. ' At the district court level, once a forum is determined, the
parties will only choose to litigate those cases in which the outcome
is somewhat indeterminate. The cases with relatively certain
outcomes will settle and therefore not appear in the range of case
results attributed to completed trials in the jurisdiction in question.
This is not to deny (as Sichelman emphasizes in his comments ")
that judges in different districts (or for that matter, in different
district courts when considered individually) may apply varying
claim construction standards. 192 Rather, the tendency of the parties to
pursue to a completed trial result only the most uncertain cases in
186. Id. at 1165-67 & n.14; Joseph Re, Litig. Partner, Knobbe Martens Olson & Bear LLP,
Address at the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Symposium: The Federal Circuit as an
Institution (Oct. 30, 2009).
187. Priest & Klein, supra note 20, at 4, 12-13.
188. Russel Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychology, Economics, and Law: A New Look at the
Role of the Lawyer, 76 TEX. L. REv. 77, 79-81 (1997).
189. Sichelman, supra note 163, at 1169-70.
190. See id. at I170.
191. Id. (discussing how conflicting claim construction precedents allow trial judges to decide
cases in ways that suit them personally).
192. Id. at 1170 n.35.
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light of the perceived and expected standards to be applied by the
relevant district court-whatever those standards are-will tend to
mask differences in claim construction standards from judge to
judge, leading to high reversal rates (in those cases actually fully
tried and appealed) from most district judges regardless of the
differences in the standards they apply.
Similarly, once the particular panel that will hear a case at the
Federal Circuit is determined, some cases will have probable
outcomes that are clearer than they were before the panel was
specified. This greater certainty in outcomes will tend to produce
some additional case settlements before a decision is rendered,
leaving only those cases that are highly uncertain, in light of the
panel that hears them, to proceed further in the appellate process and
enter into reversal rates.
Of course, differences in the predictability of the outcomes in
these processes will vary from district court to district court and from
appellate panel to appellate panel. Hence the case settlement patterns
and case outcome results will likewise vary, not because the parties
are applying different standards, but rather because they are seeing
different types of cases once the impacts of selection effects are
taken into account. Once again, the impacts of selection effects in
determining case features and outcomes should not be ignored.
C. Appealed Patent Cases
Research by Moore suggests that a substantial fraction of patent
cases that are pursued to a trial result are dropped or settled at that
point and are not pursued to a further Federal Circuit appeal. 193 In a
study of all patent cases tried over the seventeen-year period from
1983 to 1999, Moore found that 1,209 patent cases were resolved by
a fact finder (judge or jury) 194 and that 49% of these cases were not
pursued to a completed appeal. 195 This "dropout rate" of cases
terminated following a completed trial but without a completed
193. See Moore, supra note 65, at 380, 397.
194. Id. at 380.
195. Id. at 397 (noting that 51% of the cases in her study resulted in completed appeals,
meaning that 49% did not). Moore's study does not account for appeals of patent cases resolved
at the district court level through summary judgments rather than completed trials. When appeals
from these summary judgments are taken into account, the fraction of all patent cases reaching
trials that are pursued to further Federal Circuit appeals may be greater than the 51% found by
Moore for cases that produce completed trials.
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appeal is consistent with findings concerning other types of
litigation. 196 Researchers have found that 43.1% of state court cases
pursued to the point of completed trials do not result in completed
appeals. 1" This posttrial settlement rate estimate was based on state
court cases from forty-six large counties around the country and
involved cases addressing a wide variety of state law disputes. 19
The 49% of patent cases that Moore found were not appealed
following completed trials probably involved trial outcomes that
were either accepted as adequate and final by both sides or were
superseded by settlement agreements which substituted for the trial
results and removed the cases from the judicial system. 199 Only cases
that had remaining material issues and for which the parties had
lingering differences in projected case value would have tended to
continue as part of the 51% of fully tried cases brought to the Federal
Circuit. 200
The workload of the Federal Circuit is composed of only those
cases that produce an adjudicated result and that are further
appealed. 201 Settlement processes before trial, during trial, and after
trial may tend to filter out cases in which the parties see claim
construction questions similarly and are able to come to an
agreement upon case values as the bases for settlements. Speaking of
similar filtering processes that affect the selection of cases for
appeals to the U.S. Supreme Court, Jeff Yates and Elizabeth Coggins
described the ways that the appealed cases might diverge from legal
disputes generally as follows:
196. See Theodore Eisenberg & Michael Heise, Plaintiphobia in State Courts? An Empirical
Study of State Court Trials on Appeal, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 121, 135-36 tbl.2 (2009).
197. Id. at 136.
198. Id. at 127.
199. The failure to pursue this 49% of fully tried cases to an additional completed appeal is
somewhat surprising given that the additional costs of pursuing an appeal to the Federal Circuit
once a case has been fully litigated are relatively small. The fact that these cases reached a final
resolution with the trial court result (or a post-trial settlement that substituted for the trial result)
may indicate one of two underlying settlement dynamics. First, the litigants in the 49% of cases
terminated may have felt that the trial results indicated what the probable appellate result would
be such that further appeals in these cases were not seen by either side as likely to change the
expected results and, therefore, not worth their probable appeal costs even though those costs
were modest. Second, it may be that the litigants were unsure of how appeals might modify their
results at trial and, hence, could not project to what extent appeals would lead to potential gains
that would justify even modest appeal costs.
200. See Priest & Klein, supra note 20, at 4; Yates & Coggins, supra note 71, at 266.
201. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (2006).
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Litigants' strategic sorting produces a pool of cases for
possible Court review that are not randomly distributed.
Rather, this process produces a selection of cases that are
generally not amenable to settlement, likely because they
do not provide conspicuous outcome cues, or because the
litigants are otherwise constrained from resolving their
disputes through negotiated agreement. Litigants are also
apt to make some "errors" in their selection of which
disputes to appeal to the Court. We use the term "errors" to
denote decisions by litigants to appeal (or not to appeal)
that do not comport with rational estimates of their ability
to win the appeals on the merits. 202
Cases that are pressed all the way to a Federal Circuit appeal are
probably ones that, even after case discovery and a district court
result, still involve some substantial uncertainty about claim
constructions or other aspects of the cases so as to cause the parties
to value the cases differently and to be unwilling to come to an
agreement on settlement terms. In essence, cases will tend to be
appealed specifically because their outcome is unclear (or at least
because the outcome that is predicted by one of the parties is
significantly different from the trial court result and any settlement
terms proposed by the other side). 203 In short, patent cases are
appealed rather than settled (after trial or earlier) because there are
lingering factual or legal uncertainties as the cases enter the Federal
Circuit stage. Absent remaining uncertainties in areas that will make
a material difference in a case outcome, there would be little reason
for a party to spend money initiating and pursuing an appeal only to
achieve the same outcome that was reached at the trial level or
available in a settlement offer.
In summary, litigants choose cases (prior to trial, during trial,
and after trial) to press to the next stage of litigation that have major
outstanding issues which, if resolved differently at the next level,
will make a major difference in case outcomes. In terms of cases
brought to the Federal Circuit, this means that appealed cases are
frequently those that are ripe to be overturned. The fact that they
frequently are overturned is a testament to the accuracy of case
202. Yates & Coggins, supra note 71, at 284-85.
203. See id.
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appeal selections by parties who decide to press cases to Federal
Circuit appeals. Parties who obtain reversals at the Federal Circuit
are simply getting what they came for. Parties who are harmed by
these reversals would rather not be before the Federal Circuit, but
have no choice (other than to accept what may appear to be an
unreasonably low settlement offer in order to short circuit the
completion of an appeal) once the other side presses an appeal.
D. Impacts of Case Filtering on Federal Circuit Reversal Rates
1. Filtering Ensures Unrepresentativeness of Appealed Cases
Moore has recognized that appellate case selection practices of
patent litigants may cause the features of appealed claim construction
cases to diverge significantly from the characteristics of average
patent disputes. 20 She summarized her views on the distinctions
between appealed cases and patent suits as follows:
There are two predictions that could be made about the
likely outcome of the bulk of unappealed claim construction
decisions. The first prediction is that the affirmance rate
would be higher if all claim construction issues were
appealed because the parties only appeal issues when they
believe the judge was wrong. If this were true, the
construction issues that were not appealed were more likely
correct decisions by the district court judges. This
prediction implies that district court judges are, in fact,
better at construing claim terms than the empirical evidence
[of reversal rates] suggests.
The second prediction, based on economic theory, suggests
that the cases that are appealed are most likely the close
cases in which the parties are more likely to disagree on
predicted outcome. The outlier cases where the judge got
the claim construction clearly right or clearly wrong should
likely settle to avoid transaction costs. Under this theory,
the unappealed claim construction decisions are not likely
to substantially impact affirmance rates. 205
204. See Moore, supra note 1, at 9-10.
205. Id. (footnotes omitted). Moore goes on to note:
The selection effect theory, however, appears flawed when applied to appellate
outcome statistics. Consistently elevated affirmance rates in the appellate courts
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According to Moore, these selection effects "suggest that
appealed claim construction decisions may not be a random sample
of all claim construction disputes." 2 06
2. Appealed Cases Are Highly Uncertain,
Leading to High Reversal Rates
Those few cases which are appealed to the Federal Circuit-and
which therefore determine Federal Circuit reversal rates-are likely
to involve much greater uncertainties than the average patent
enforcement controversy. This is the case because case settlement
processes will tend to weed out those cases that are viewed similarly
by the parties because the cases are based on relatively clear legal
standards and factual issues. Only those cases that survive this
filtering (probably due to material uncertainties that cause the
opposing litigants to take very different views of case value) will
proceed through a trial to an appeal and yield a Federal Circuit result.
Federal Circuit reversal rates are the products of these highly
uncertain appeals.
The tendency of case uncertainty to promote and prolong
litigation is not peculiar to the patent field, but is rather a long
recognized dynamic in litigation generally. 207 For example, Judge
suggests that unless there is consistent deviation from the underlying assumptions of
this economic model, the model is not successful in predicting the selection of cases
which are appealed. This may be attributable to the fact that appeal transaction costs
are relatively low compared to the trial costs, therefore we expect more "Hail Mary"
appeals.
Id. at 10 (footnotes omitted).
Moore's bases for questioning the impact of selection effects on appellate affirmances of
lower court results seem not to apply to appellate data on claim construction appeals. The reversal
rates for claim construction appeals are relatively high, unlike the cases with low appellate
reversal rates cited by Moore. As discussed further in the main text, the appellate reversal rates
for claim construction appeals appear to conform to the pattern expected under selection effects,
unlike the cases with lower reversal rates that Moore considered.
Furthermore, even if some Hail Mary appeals are pursued with a relatively low
likelihood of success, these will still tend to be ones with substantial uncertainties where both
parties perceive that there is at least some chance of success. Cases that involve few uncertainties
will still tend to drop out of the appealed stream of cases, meaning that the cases appealed and
decided by the Federal Circuit will involve more uncertainties than average litigated cases.
Moore's other research indicates that only about 51% of patent cases that lead to trial results are
appealed. Moore, supra note 65, at 380, 397 tbl.6. The remaining 49% that are settled are
presumably the relatively certain cases that support similar visions of case value on the part of the
litigants and corresponding agreements on settlement values and terms.
206. Moore, supra note 1, at 10.
207. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 588-89 (5th ed. 1998).
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Richard A. Posner, in his classic work Economic Analysis of Law,
projected that litigation results from a divergence of estimates of case
value by opposing parties, leading to the filing and pursuit of a
lawsuit. 208 Absent such a divergence, parties tend to settle filed cases,
removing these cases from the flow of litigation. 209 So long as the
divergence persists, litigants are motivated to keep their cases alive
and to cling to disparate estimates of case value that preclude
agreements on settlements. 210
Even before the filing of a patent infringement lawsuit,
informally pressed patent dispute resolution mechanisms (pursued
through devices such as demand letters or other enforcement steps
short of litigation) may resolve some patent liability claims with the
lowest uncertainty. Relatively certain claims will tend to be resolved
if, prior to the filing of a suit, both parties agree on the merit of a
claim and the probable damages or injunctive relief the plaintiff
patent holder is likely to obtain if the matter is pursued through
litigation. In these circumstances, a similar vision of a case held by
potential litigants may preclude any suit from being filed and
produce the equivalent of a case settlement in the pretrial stage. The
dispute involved-never filed as a lawsuit, much less pressed to an
appeal-will have no influence on Federal Circuit appellate reversal
rates.
Similar settlement dynamics will apply to filed patent cases
before, during, and after trials. Where they conclude that there are
few, if any, material outstanding issues regarding key legal or factual
questions, parties who might pursue an appeal may choose instead to
settle a case or accept a trial level result and avoid any further
proceedings. Decisions like these will cause yet another component
of relatively certain cases to drop out of the flow of cases to the
Federal Circuit, leaving only a remainder of particularly uncertain
cases to be decided by the Federal Circuit and to influence Federal





CLAIM CONSTRUCTION RE VERSAL RATES
3. Judicial Experience and Better Claim Construction Guidance May
Not Improve Reversal Rates Because Uncertain Cases Will
Dominate Appeals
Because selection processes will respond to changes in
substantive patent laws, appellate review standards, and judicial
experience with claim construction and will continue to choose cases
for appeal to the Federal Circuit that involve substantial uncertainties
despite these sorts of changes in substantive laws, review standards,
and judicial experience, appellate case uncertainty and reversal rates
are likely to remain high regardless of these factors. That is not to
say that the clarity of claim construction standards is unimportant. To
the contrary, clarity in this regard is very important in two contexts:
first, in aiding parties with existing patent disputes to come to joint,
overlapping estimates of case values and to construct settlements;
and, second, in preventing infringement by assisting parties to
determine whether planned conduct will probably be infringing such
that they should either obtain a license to use the patented technology
involved or work or design around the patented technology so as not
to infringe.
In these contexts, clearer standards would produce fewer patent
disputes, fewer disputes that result in filed cases, fewer filed cases
that proceed all the way to completed trials, and fewer Federal
Circuit appeals from trial results. However, even with highly clear
claim construction standards that have all of these beneficial impacts,
Federal Circuit claim construction appeals would still tend to include
those cases with significant remaining uncertainties about the proper
claim constructions. Because of these lingering uncertainties, these
cases would probably still produce high reversal rates at the Federal
Circuit level.
Given that there will probably always be some claim
construction disputes that litigants see differently after completed
trials such that the related cases do not settle, there will continue to
be some cases involving substantial claim construction issues
appealed to the Federal Circuit. These will tend to be cases where
several claim constructions are supported by the record and the
different constructions, if adopted, will make material differences in
the case outcomes. Given that cases will be selected for appeal
because they have these material uncertainties, many of these
appealed cases are likely to produce Federal Circuit reversals.
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Reversals will be likely as the judges on the Federal Circuit perceive
the material uncertainties inherent in these cases and adopt claim
construction resolutions of the uncertainties that differ from the
constructions selected by the district courts in these cases. The
associated high rate of Federal Circuit reversals will prevail because
the cases under consideration are differentially selected for the
presence of disputed and material case issues, and the Federal Circuit
judges are responding to these frequently present uncertainties.
Nothing in this analysis depends on the governing law, the standard
of review applied at the Federal Circuit, or the experience of the
judges involved at the trial or appellate levels. Hence, selection
theory predicts that reversal rates seen for claim construction
analyses will be constant over time even as standards and resources
available for claim construction change.
Even judges with substantial experience in conducting claim
constructions may not be able to greatly reduce their rates of claim
construction reversals on appeal. 211 Selection effects at both the trial
and appellate levels will work against experience making any
difference in reversal rates. At the trial level, if litigants regularly
bring to trial only those disputes with perceived uncertainties in
claim constructions while settling cases in which the parties can
generally agree on claim constructions and infringement scope, then
judges facing the uncertain claims contested in trials will be
challenged with substantial uncertainties in every case, often in new
and highly technical factual realms. The likelihood that even a judge
who has conducted several claims constructions will deal with two
construction issues with the same types of factual ambiguities in the
same technological area is very small if not zero. Hence, selection
effects bringing mostly uncertain cases to trial courts will tend to
ensure that there are high risks of errors (or at least plausible
alternative constructions) in every claim construction by trial courts.
The difficulty of the cases presented-coupled with the fact that they
will tend to be in different factual and technological areas-will
ensure that any learning about claim construction that occurs in the
technological area of one case is unlikely to carry over beneficially
to improve claim construction in the different technological area of
211. David L. Schwartz, Courting Specialization: An Empirical Study of Claim Construction
Comparing Patent Litigation Before Federal District Courts and the International Trade
Commission, 50 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1699, 1702 (2009); Schwartz, supra note 1, at 255-56.
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the next case handled by the same judge. In short, "practice" in claim
construction with the especially uncertain and difficult cases brought
to trial by patent litigants may not make "perfect" or improve the
ability of a judge to deal with the next also difficult and uncertain
case selected by the next set of litigants to be brought to trial and
presented to the judge for a claim construction.
Selection effects at the appellate level may make the apparent
reversal rates of trial judges roughly the same even among judges
differing materially in how much they adhere to Federal Circuit
standards for claim construction. For example, assume that Judges A
and B each conduct claim constructions in ten cases, all of which
lead to trial results and are candidates for appeal. Assume that Judge
A diverges from Federal Circuit guidance on how to approach claim
construction in three of his ten cases, while Judge B diverges in six
of his ten cases. All ten of Judge B's cases are appealed and produce
a Federal Circuit reversal in the six cases where he diverged from
Federal Circuit standards. Only five of Judge A's cases are appealed
(the three with erroneous claim construction analyses and two more)
resulting in reversals of the three cases where he diverged from the
Federal Circuit standards. The remainder of Judge A's cases were
not appealed because the litigants recognized that the other five
results were in accordance with Federal Circuit standards and not
materially different from the results that the Federal Circuit would
reach if a costly appeal were mounted. Despite the differing degree
to which the rulings of these two district courts adhered to Federal
Circuit standards, the apparent reversal rate of the two judges in
Federal Circuit appeals will be equal (that is, 60% of the appealed
cases).
Clearly, the equality of the claim construction reversal rates for
these two judges is not a good indicator of the success of these two
courts in adhering to Federal Circuit standards. The equality of the
rates only means that the cases from these two judges that were
brought to the Federal Circuit involved equal percentages of errors
resulting in equal reversal rates. What is ignored in this analysis is
the impact of settlements in removing cases with correct results
agreed upon by the parties from further judicial actions by appellate
courts and measurements in appellate reversal rates. Put another way,
cases that are not appealed would, if appealed, be highly likely to be
affirmed, thereby dramatically altering and lowering measured
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reversal rates. The fact that selection processes remove these cases
from consideration in determining case reversal rates ensures that
these rates will be especially high.212
V. COMPARING REVERSAL RATES WITH
PREDICTIONS OF SELECTION THEORY
A. Invariance ofReversal Rates over Time
As previously discussed, 2 13 appellate case selection theory
predicts that claim construction case reversal rates will remain high
and relatively constant over time despite changes in applicable laws,
standards of review, judicial experience, or judicial personnel. This is
predicted to be the case because litigants will tend to take these
factors into account and only appeal those cases where they perceive
that they have a high likelihood to prevail. Because the decisions of
litigants about which cases to appeal are based on changing criteria,
the claim construction cases coming to the Federal Circuit always
212. Schwartz has considered the possible impact of different appeal rates on the reversal
rates seen for cases on appeal. Schwartz, supra note 1, at 282-84. He identified district courts
with decisions in claim construction cases that "were reversed, vacated, and/or remanded (1)
much less often than the average rate; (2) much more often than the average rate; and (3) at any
other rate." Id. at 283. He found that the appeal rate for courts with low reversal rates was 0.0556,
the appeal rate for courts with high reversal rates was 0.0620, and the appeal rate for judges with
about average reversal rates was 0.0563. Id. at 283. He concluded that this suggests "there is at
least some empirical support for the proposition that litigants appeal cases at a greater frequency
from judges that have been reversed more often," but that "the amount of this selection bias
appears relatively small, especially when compared with the overall level of appeals." Id. at 284.
He notes further that these conclusions are based on a very small set of data. Id.
Schwartz's conclusions about the limited impact of selection effects on appeal rates for
categories of courts are not inconsistent with the hypothetical analysis discussed in the main text.
Different appeal rates for the judges within the high, low, and average reversal rate groups that
Schwartz considers may have determined why these courts had similar reversal rates putting them
in the same categories. The fact that the average appeal rates for the three categories of courts
considered by Schwartz were about the same is not inconsistent with the notion-for the reasons
expressed in the analysis in the main text-that different appeal rates for particular district courts
may have produced roughly equal reversal rates (high, low, or average) for two or more district
courts that actually differed in their adherence to Federal Circuit standards for claim construction.
For example, one court might have a high reversal rate because only a few of its cases
have unresolved claim construction issues after trial and only these cases are appealed while
another court might have a high reversal rate because all of its claim construction decisions retain
high uncertainties after trial and all of these are appealed. Both of these courts would fall within
the high reversal rate category considered by Schwartz, but they would reflect very different
appeal rates per court. These differences per court would be obscured when the appeal rate for the
category of courts with high reversal rates was considered at the group level. The group appeal
rate would be a blend of these disparate appeal rates for particular courts, obscuring the
differences at the court level that accounted for similarly high appellate reversal rates per court.
213. See supra Part III.D.
1052
CLAIM CONSTRUCTION REVERSAL RATES
have substantial outstanding issues and material uncertainties
regardless of their legal background or judicial pedigree. Hence, they
are always subject to substantial and relatively unchanging reversal
rates.
Moore's and Schwartz's findings regarding reversal rates in
claim construction cases suggest that Federal Circuit reversal rates in
claim construction cases have conformed to this constant level over
time. 214 Moore, focusing on Federal Circuit decisions from 1996
through 2003, found a case reversal/vacate rate due to claim
construction analyses of 29.7%; 215 Schwartz, focusing on cases
decided by the Federal Circuit from 1996 through 2007, found a
reversal/vacate rate of 29.7%, identical to Moore's measurement. 216
Since Schwartz's study addressed the cases considered in Moore's
study plus a complement of cases decided from 2004 through 2007,
the similarity of the reversal rates found in Moore's and Schwartz's
studies implies (as a mathematical necessity) that the reversal rate for
cases from 2004 to 2007 was also about 29.7%. These rates, moving
neither a great deal up nor down over time, suggest that they are
relatively insensitive to changes in law, judicial personnel or judicial
experience with claim construction. Rather, these similar rates
provide some confirmation of the predictions of case selection
theory-that is, that case reversal rates will depend on the selection
practices of litigants, which will take into account and effectively
nullify the influence on reversal rates of changes in law and judicial
personnel. In sum, the consistency of claim construction reversal
rates across time is consistent with the view of selection theory that
cases decided on appeal are a constructed set leading to consistent
reversal rates despite many changes in case circumstances,
surrounding law, and judicial personnel.
B. Shifts in Reversal Rates Favoring Plaintiffs or Defendants
Selection theory also predicts that case reversal rates will
approximate 50% if the parties in appealed cases assess the value of
the cases in roughly equal terms (with roughly equal substantive
valuations and means of assessing case values). 217 This prediction of
214. See Moore, supra note 2, at 239; Schwartz, supra note 1, at 248-49.
215. Moore, supra note 2, at 239.
216. Schwartz, supra note 1, at 248-49.
217. Priest & Klein, supra note 20, at 19-21.
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a 50% success rate (equivalent to a 50% reversal rate) is clearly not
met for claim construction appeals, which seem to have had a
reversal rate of well below 50% for some time. 218
However, Priest and Klein's selection model provides an
alternative prediction that reversal rates will shift from 50% in favor
of the parties who have the most at stake in appeals or who perceive
that they do. 219 In the instance of appealed patent cases with claim
construction issues, a variety of factors may cause plaintiffs or
defendants to perceive that they have more at stake than their
opponents. 220
For example, in some instances, the defendants will perceive
greater interests in pressing appeals because they are especially
concerned about the business disruptions flowing from district court
rulings granting the plaintiffs broad injunctions. In other instances,
the plaintiffs will perceive greater interests in appealing district court
rulings invalidating patents because the plaintiffs will need to
overturn these rulings on appeal to retain the ability to enforce their
patents against additional defendants. In some cases, the plaintiffs
will be more risk-preferring than the defendants (meaning that the
attraction of small recoveries will loom larger than would be the case
to a risk-neutral party, and the risk-preferring party will act like a
party with a lot at stake in the appeal) and in other cases the more
risk-preferring parties will be the defendants. In some cases,
plaintiffs will have the greater experience with the technologies at
issue in claim constructions (thereby giving them better abilities to
make accurate estimates of claim uncertainty and case value
implications), and in other cases the defendants will have this greater
experience and information. In some cases, the plaintiffs will be
more experienced in the relevant markets and be better able to
project the commercial implications and case value impacts of patent
case victories or losses, and in other cases the defendants will have
these sorts of greater insights.
218. See Moore, supra note 2, at 239 (finding a claim construction reversal rate of 29.7% for
Federal Circuit cases decided from 1996 to 2003); Schwartz, supra note 1, at 248-49 (finding a
reversal rate in claim construction appeals of 29.7% for Federal Circuit cases decided from 1996
to 2007).
219. Priest & Klein, supra note 20, at 24-26.
220. See id at 24-29.
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While these factors may skew the case value estimates and
decision making of litigants in individual cases, in the aggregate of
all the appealed cases considered in computing reversal rates, the
sorts of factors mentioned above probably cancel out to have little or
no net effect on claim construction reversal rates measured over a
considerable number of appealed cases. This is because these
characteristics are probably randomly distributed among the various
patent cases in which claim construction issues are appealed and
considered by the Federal Circuit.
Claim construction issues-and the possibility that an
alternative claim construction will form a ground for reversal-cut
across cases of all types in which the strategic importance of the
cases for plaintiffs and defendants may vary greatly. There are no
particular reasons to think that the case and litigant characteristics
mentioned above will correlate with claim construction appeals or
give plaintiffs or defendants a likely net advantage in success rates in
these appeals due to selection effects. In some appealed cases, the
amounts perceived to be at stake by plaintiffs will be greater, and in
others the amounts perceived to be at stake by defendants will be
greater. These types of cases will shift reversal rates in opposite
directions, tending to produce no net change. Hence, even
considering these particular case and litigant features, Priest and
Klein's model would still project a 50% reversal rate for claim
construction appeals to the Federal Circuit.
Actual Federal Circuit reversal rates measured by Moore do
show equal claim construction reversal rates for plaintiffs and
defendants in appeals that each of them initiate, 221 suggesting that
case factors other than who succeeded at trial do not have much
influence on the cases selected by litigants for appeals and the
success that litigants achieve there. Moore found appellate reversal
rates for cases in which patent holders prevailed on claim
construction grounds at trial were almost identical (32.3%) to the
reversal rates on appeal for cases in which defendants prevailed at
trial (33.2%). 222
The reasons why these rates found by Moore deviate from the
50% rates suggested by Priest and Klein's model are discussed in the
221. Moore, supra note 2, at 241 tbl.1.
222. Id.
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next section. 223 However, the similarity of these rates provides us
with some information about possible patterns of case valuations by
patent case plaintiffs and defendants as they decide whether to press
cases for appeals. The equality of these rates found by Moore is
consistent with the view that-controlling for who won at trial-
plaintiffs and defendants succeed in Federal Circuit appeals at about
the same rates. 224 This is consistent with the view that they tend to
assess what they have at stake in a Federal Circuit appeal similarly.
That is, taking into account their assessments in the aggregate over
the multiple cases considered in measuring Federal Circuit reversal
rates, plaintiffs and defendants who have won at trial in patent
litigation perceive what they have at stake in appeals similarly,
choose to proceed similarly with appeals rather than settling at post-
trial stages, and achieve similar success before the Federal Circuit.
This supports the view that, aggregated over the broad range of
patent cases appealed, there are few if any net views on the part of
plaintiffs who have won at trial that they have more at stake than
defendants who have won at trial.
C. Endowment Effects: Similarly Shifting
Reversal Rates Towards Plaintiffs or Defendants
Of course, the reversal rates of about 32% to 33% found by
Moore 2 5 for both plaintiffs and defendants who have prevailed on
claim construction issues at trial still deviate substantially from the
50% rate suggested by Priest and Klein's basic model (that is, their
model of case selection that assumes parties view case values
relatively equally). 226 It was predicted earlier in this Article that
endowment effects causing whomever prevailed at trial-plaintiff or
defendant-to become attached to this case result and see more at
stake in keeping this result on appeal than his or her opponent would
see in overturning the result would shift appellate success rates
223. See infra Part V.C.
224. See Moore, supra note 2, at 241 (arguing that "the Federal Circuit is just as likely to
reverse a claim construction appeal which was won by the infringer at the district court level as
one won by the patentee").
225. Id. at 241 tbl.l.
226. Priest & Klein, supra note 20, at 19-21.
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concerning claim construction appeals in favor of the party who
prevailed at trial. 227
The reversal rates found by Moore exhibit just this
characteristic. 228 Moore found 32.3% reversal rates for cases in
which patent holders prevailed on claim construction grounds at trial,
meaning that in 68.7% of the appealed cases where the patent holders
prevailed in their claim construction contentions at trial, their
positions were affirmed on appeal and no reversals were ordered. 229
Similarly, Moore found reversal rates of 33.2% on appeal for cases
in which defendants prevailed at trial, meaning that in 66.8% of
cases the defendant's contentions at trial were upheld on appeal. 230 in
short, the appellate rates on appeal are shifted substantially in favor
of the party who won on claim construction issues at trial, a result
consistent with the winning party having a heightened aversion to
giving up the litigation advantages of her favorable ruling at trial and
thus assessing her stakes in keeping those advantages through a
successful appeal (that is, an affirmance) as being especially high
due to this endowment effect.
The common ground in these results is that the prevailing party
at trial (whether plaintiff or defendant) generally feels, due to
endowment effects, that he or she has more to lose in an appeal than
his or her opponent. 231 Hence, this perception of greater stakes
causes the party prevailing at trial to be willing to settle weaker cases
and to continue only especially strong cases to a final result on
appeal. This, in turn, increases this party's success on appeal and
reduces her likelihood of reversal to below the 50% predicated for
parties who perceive that they have equal stakes on appeal.
The perception of having more at stake in an appeal tends to
cause the prevailing party at trial to refrain from taking chances on a
full appeal in some weaker cases, and to settle those cases even
though the party would continue on to a Federal Circuit appeal if he
or she thought less was a stake. The result is that Federal Circuit
reversal rates reflect a stronger set of appealed cases from the
perspective of the party prevailing at trial and, as a consequence, a
227. See supra Part II.D.3.
228. See Moore, supra note 2, at 241 tbl. 1.
229. See id.
230. See id.
231. See id. at 240.
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greater than 50% success rate for that prevailing party. This is the
pattern we see for claim construction appeals in patent cases.
In summary, endowment effects causing plaintiffs or defendants
who prevail at trial on claim construction grounds to see themselves
as having greater interests at stake on appeal than their opponents
probably account for why Federal Circuit reversal rates are about
30% for these prevailing parties rather than 50%. 232
Moore's results indicate that Federal Circuit reversals favored
neither plaintiffs nor defendants, but rather involve about 30%
reversal rates for both. 233 The equality of these rates-despite the
lack of similarity of legal positions of patent holders and accused
defendants in patent litigation and appeals-suggests that the
common source of the reversal rates lies not in the substance of the
parties' respective legal positions nor in factual circumstances
favoring one side or the other, but rather in shared endowment
effects that both plaintiffs and defendants experience when they are
prevailing parties at trial. Their interests in keeping the advantages
(both economic and strategic) implied by favorable trial court results
causes the parties prevailing at trial to build up expectations and
perceived stakes in retaining the trial results that are greater than the
dollars at stake might otherwise indicate. Because of these
endowment effects causing prevailing parties to be biased somewhat
away from purely rational assessments of what is at stake in appeals,
parties prevailing on claim construction issues at trial will tend to
feel that they have more at stake in keeping their prevailing positions
in appeals than their opponents feel that they have in taking away the
advantages of those prevailing positions.
Federal Circuit reversal rates are, under this analysis, largely
dictated by appellate case selection effects, as modified by
endowment effects causing prevailing parties at trial to
systematically overvalue the desirability of keeping their favorable
trial court results through success on appeal. These rates do not
depend on the state of claim construction guidance from the Federal
Circuit, the skills or experience in claim construction of district
courts, or the standard of review used by the Federal Circuit to
evaluate lower court claim constructions.
232. Id. at 241.
233. Id. at 241 tbl.1.
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Nor will a shift up or down in presently measured reversal rates
tell us anything one way or the other about the betterment of the
Federal Circuit's guidance to district courts regarding claim
constructions, the skills of district courts in carrying out claim
constructions, or the desirability of more deferential standards of
claim construction review if adopted by the Federal Circuit. These
factors do not, under a selection theory analysis, bear upon reversal
rates. Hence, if a change in these rates were to be detected, its source
would need to be found in appellate case selection processes, not in
factors like those just mentioned that do not substantially influence
claim construction reversal rates.
D. Comparing Claim Construction
Reversal Rates to Other Reversal Rates
In his separate discussions in this symposium issue, Sichelman
analyzes the reversal rates for different types of civil cases and finds
that the appellate reversal rate for patent claim construction cases is
higher than the rates for many other types of civil cases. 234 His data
on other cases are, as he points out, from a different source than the
data on patent claim construction reversal rates, so the comparability
of the rates that he uses in his analysis is in some doubt. 235 Assuming
that these rates reflect case outcomes that have been measured and
coded in comparable ways, the fact that the reversal rates differ for
several different types of cases does not establish that selection
effects are not at work in determining these rates. The impact of
selection effects, as I have previously discussed,"' varies with
factors such as stake asymmetry (that is, differences in the amounts
or interests that the parties have at stake in a particular case); the
uncertainty of the parties in estimating the quality of their cases and
case outcomes; and the ability of one party to better estimate case
outcomes than the other party. 237 Where these factors differ, the
reversal rates predicted by the Priest-Klein theory will differ from
50% by varying amounts. The differences in reversal rates noted by
Sichelman may reflect no more than differences due to these factors.
234. Sichelman, supra note 163, at 1172-74.
235. Id. at 1173-74.
236. See supra Part IlIl.A.
237. See Peter Siegelman & Joel Waldfogel, Toward a Taxonomy ofDisputes: New Evidence
Through the Prism ofthe Priest/Klein Model, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 101, 108-16 (1999).
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Whether or not this is the case is beyond the scope of this Article.
However, differences between claim construction reversal rates and
those of other civil cases do not necessarily indicate that the
standards applicable to patent cases are less determinant than other
civil law standards. These differences in reversal rates may reflect no
more than differences in litigation circumstances and processes for
various types of cases that cause cases with different likelihoods of
reversal to be selected for litigation and pressed to the point of
completed appeals, thereby influencing appellate reversal rates.
The same is true of the reversal rates that Sichelman cites for
patent issues other than claim construction issues. 2' Once again, the
reversal rates he cites for issues other than claim construction come
from a different source than the claim construction reversal rates he
uses in his analysis, leading to some concern over comparability. 239
However, assuming that these rates were determined in a roughly
similar fashion, the differences he notes across patent law issues may
be explainable in terms of the factors mentioned in the prior
paragraph. In determining the impact of these factors, it will be
important to focus on the reversal rates for plaintiffs and defendants
separately. The circumstances of plaintiffs and defendants with
respect to the above factors may be very different as these types of
parties seek to retain or reverse results at trial. Accordingly, their
decisions about which cases to appeal may influence appellate
reversal rates in very different ways. 240 Sichelman seems to say that
reversal rates at the Federal Circuit are problematic because the
average of the issue-by-issue reversal rates for cases in which
238. Sichelman, supra note 163, at 1174-76.
239. Id.
240. For example, as Sichelman notes in his analysis, a patent holder will have more at stake
in an appeal concerning patent validity (since the future enforcement of the party's patent will be
at issue in addition to the liability claimed in the case at hand) than will an accused infringer (who
will only risk losing the presently contested liability amount). Id. at 1177. This stake asymmetry
means that patent holders and accused infringers will often approach appeals of patent validity
rulings against them with significantly different mindsets leading to different case selections for
appeals and different appellate reversal rates. As Sichelman further notes, patent holders' greater
stakes in invalidity rulings suggest that patent holders will tend to appeal more weak cases
concerning validity issues than will accused infringers, leading to a lower reversal rate (due to the
greater prevalence of weak cases) in appeals of patent validity issues by patent holders than in
similar appeals by accused infringers, a pattern consistent with the data displayed in figures I and
2 in Sichelman's article. Id. For reasons such as this, a complete assessment of selection effect
impacts on appellate reversal rates should focus separately on the reversal rates for patent holders
and accused infringers as each appeals adverse rulings.
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accused infringers won at trial (and patent holders initiated appeals)
is greater than the average when appeals by all parties are
included. 241 For the reasons just discussed, it may not be meaningful
to consider average reversal rates across multiple patent law issues
(where factors like stake asymmetry may differ greatly across
different issues) or to worry about the magnitude of an overall
average reversal rate computed without singling out the rates for
appeals by patent holders and accused infringers as discussed above.
The meaning of this disparity in average rates noted by Sichelman is
unclear and may just be an artifact of his aggregation of rates
emerging from disparate appellate case selection processes related to
different issue types and different perspectives of patent holders and
accused infringers. An attempt to make such evaluations of reversal
rates without careful consideration of all of the factors mentioned in
the prior paragraph is premature and beyond the scope of this Article.
Once patent case reversal rates are disaggregated to reflect
different reversal rates for plaintiffs and defendants receiving adverse
results at trial, the appellate reversal rates for plaintiffs or defendants
are often higher for other patent issues than the reversal rates for
claim construction issues. Indeed, as Sichelman shows in figures 2
and 3 of his article, the reversal rates for claim construction issues
are at about the middle of the range of reversal rates for all patent
law issues reflected in his data. 242 Whether this pattern of reversal
rates can be fully explained in terms of the factors mentioned in the
prior paragraph is beyond the scope of this Article. However, the
claim construction reversal rates shown in Sichelman's figures 2 and
3 (where rates for plaintiffs and defendants are properly
disaggregated to reflect their different interests and circumstances as
they pursue appeals from adverse results at trial) are at about the
middle of the range for patent issues generally. 243 This belies the
notion that claim construction rates are especially out of control or
problematic, at least relative to the reversal rates for other patent
issues.
Sichelman puts forth a hypothetical framed in terms of "dice
rolls" and "conspiracy theory" to analyze my arguments. 244 1, of
241. Id. at 1178.
242. Id. at 1177.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 1183.
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course, have not suggested that the Federal Circuit works through
claim construction analyses that are the equivalent of "dice throws"
or that there is some "conspiracy theory" accounting for the Federal
Circuit's claim construction processes. I assume that Sichelman does
not think this either, despite his use of these colorful terms. 245 What I
do think is that those very few claim construction cases that result in
Federal Circuit analyses and decisions (and therefore account for
reversal rates in this court) involve close cases on which reasonable
minds (particularly those applying a de novo standard of review) can
differ and often do. This characteristic of the cases accounts for
differences between district courts and Federal Circuit analyses in
the very few cases that do not settle before a Federal Circuit review,
not some fanciful "dice roll" or "conspiracy theory." 2 46 Fortunately,
as my analysis recounts, this highly uncertain slice of cases resolved
by the Federal Circuit is a small one, with the great bulk of cases
being resolved through settlements. The remaining uncertainty of
those few cases reaching the Federal Circuit may well be
irresolvable, and the associated claim construction reversal rate in the
Federal Circuit may be irreducible. In short, reasonable minds may
continue to differ regarding claim constructions in the highly
uncertain but few cases reaching the Federal Circuit.
Sichelman objects that I have not presented a complete data
analysis supporting my view. 247 Such an analysis is far beyond the
scope of the present Article, which is aimed at clarifying the
potential impacts of selection effects on Federal Circuit cases and
claim construction reversal rates. A careful analysis of the impact of
selection effects on reversal rates for claim construction issues and
other issues (leading to a potential comparison of which, if any, are
"high" relative to others) would require consideration of such control
variables as the stake asymmetry of the parties, the uncertainty of the
parties in estimating the quality of their cases and case outcomes, and
the ability of one party to better estimate case outcomes than the




247. See id. at 1183.
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However, Sichelman's data hardly confirms his contrary
contention that Federal Circuit claim construction reversal rates are
exceptional. 248 His results are mixed-figure 1 in his article, which
summarizes total reversal rates (combining rates for patent holders
and accused infringers when they press appeals), seems to show a
higher claim construction reversal rate than that for other patent law
issues,24 9 while figures 2 and 3 (which separately display the rates for
appeals pressed by patent holders and accused infringers), do not
show exceptionally high claim construction reversal rates. 250 This
evidence is, at best, ambiguous and preliminary.
Additionally, as with studies of selection effects in this area,
studies of Federal Circuit reversal rates across diverse patent law
issues of the type presented in rough form by Sichelman would
benefit from the consideration of key control variables reflecting
factors other than Federal Circuit analyses that may account for the
reversal rate differences that Sichelman notes. 251 Important control
variables potentially accounting for the issue-by-issue reversal rate
differences reported by Sichelman include factors like stake
asymmetry of the parties potentially leading to more extensive and
effective advocacy on one side for some issues than for others and
differing abilities of the parties to evaluate the strengths and
weaknesses of their cases and to present more effective arguments
for some issues than for others. Absent consideration of these types
of factors outside the decision-making processes of the Federal
Circuit itself, it is probably not proper to attribute differences in
reversal rates across patent law issues to weaknesses of the Federal
Circuit's analyses of any particular category of issues such as claim
construction issues. The most that can be said of the data analyses
and data implications in this area is that they are incomplete and we
should, for now, leave it at that.
248. Id.
249. See id. at 1175 fig.1 (showing a 33% reversal rate for claim construction, with section
102(a) anticipation at 38% and indefiniteness at 38%).
250. Id. at 1177 fig.2&3.
251. Id. at 1175-77.
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VI. USING SETTLEMENT RATES (NOT REVERSAL RATES) AS
MEASURES OF CLAIM CONSTRUCTION CLARITY
One implication of the research described in this Article is that
settlement rates (that is, the percentage of all patent cases that are
resolved through settlements rather than trials or appeals) are better
indicators of legal standard clarity than are reversal rates or other
measures of appellate court disagreements with district court results.
Moore has recognized that selection effects may be a source of
skewing in the characteristics of cases appealed to the Federal
Circuit-in particular, causing these cases to be skewed towards a
high prevalence of cases with uncertainties in material facts as seen
by the parties. 252 She treats the case selection process as an incidental
feature of patent case dynamics and appeals, and attempts to control
for these selection effects as she seeks to analyze the adverse
implications of the Federal Circuit's claim construction reversal
rates."' However, given that selection processes operating over the
course of patent litigation actually eliminate most of the cases that
are filed, these selection processes are not secondary effects skewing
an underlying, more fundamental system of litigation and appeals.
Rather, the selection processes are (by virtue of dominating the
largest fraction of case dispositions) the primary processes, subject
only to the need for litigation and appeal in those few cases where
settlement discussions fail. Put another way, litigation and appeals
keep settlement processes focused on patent law standards because
parties considering settlement know that, by resisting settlement,
either party can opt for the outcomes that litigation and appeal will
afford. However, settlement discussions are the primary vehicle for
case resolutions and the merit of claim construction standards in
establishing clear and predictable claim scope should be measured
using the impact of those standards on case settlements.
Using this perspective on desirable claim construction standards
and how to measure their success indicates that we should focus
more on measurements of settlement success and less on
measurements of consistent judicial results across trial and appellate
courts. Claim construction standards are successful under this
measure if they communicate useful and shared standards to case
252. See Moore, supra note 15, at 83-90.
253. See id. at 91-92 (discussing which parties bring suit in patent cases).
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litigants who are considering case settlements. This will tend to be
true where claim construction standards produce sufficient joint
visions of claim scope and patent infringement value to support a
settlement agreement. Conversely, the failure to reach a case
settlement short of an appeal indicates that the litigants have been
unable to reach a common vision of claim scope and infringement
even with the aid of the fact-finding and judicial analyses involved in
a trial. Under this logic, the prevalence of case settlements among
filed patent cases provides some measure of the success of claim
construction standards in establishing consistently applied
frameworks within which litigants can project claim scope and
associated ranges of infringement and reach associated settlement
agreements. In sum, percentage rates of patent case settlements serve
as rough measures of standard clarity.
Given this, our assessments of the Federal Circuit's claim
construction standards should depend not on appellate reversal
rates-which are heavily influenced and elevated by case selection
practices emphasizing uncertain cases likely to lead to reversals-but
rather case settlement rates. Where a high percentage of cases settle
rather than proceeding to an appellate court resolution, this is
substantial evidence that most litigants found the relevant claim
construction standards sufficiently clear and useful to reach fairly
similar visions of claim scope and infringement characteristics,
leading to similar estimates of case value and acceptable settlement
terms.
Using settlement rates (equal to the percentage of all litigated
cases that are settled) as a measure of claim construction clarity
suggests that claim construction standards emanating from the
Federal Circuit are highly clear and becoming clearer. Patent case
settlement rates in 2008 of approximately 88% of filed cases indicate
that the great majority of all litigants see claim construction
standards as relatively settled and clear. 254 These rates are higher
than the settlement rates of 76% found for the years 1995 through
1999. 255 These figures indicate that case clarity is high among patent
litigants (as revealed by the high case settlement percentages in both
254. See UNIV. OF HOUSTON LAW CTR., supra note 4.
255. Moore, supra note 135, at 913.
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of these time frames) and growing clearer (as suggested by the larger
percentage figure for the more recent data).
Kesan and Ball's findings regarding patent case resolutions
provide further evidence that patent law standards are growing
increasingly clear and producing more settlements. 256 Their study
addressed the resolution of patent cases initiated in 1995, 1997, and
2000.257 The former year was chosen, in part, because most of the
cases initiated in that year were resolved after the Supreme Court's
Markman decision25 8 describing the central role of district courts in
claim construction and requiring judicial rulings on claim
construction 259 in what have been commonly been referred to since
as "Markman hearings."2 60 Settlement rates measured for cases
initiated in the three years covered by Kesan and Ball's study
presumably reflect increasing experience of counsel in predicting the
claim construction results they would achieve in trials incorporating
Markman hearings and in constructing settlement terms and
discussions accordingly. This increased experience would tend to
decrease the uncertainties in claim construction analyses over time.
In short, one would expect increasing settlement rates (that is,
increasing percentages of cases settled before trial rather than
continued to trial) over time.
This is exactly the pattern found by Kesan and Ball. 261 They
measured the fractions of cases settled (or otherwise resolved by the
parties before trial) for cases initiated in 1995, 1997, and 2000 as
84%, 87%, and 89% respectively. 262 While the differences in these
percentages may seem modest, they correspond to statistically
256. See Kesan & Ball, supra note 95.
257. Id. at 250.
258. Id. at 259-60.
259. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996).
260. See Moore, supra note 1, at 7.
261. See Kesan & Ball, supra note 95, at 272.
262. See id. at 271 (noting that 16% of cases filed in 1995, 13% of cases filed in 1997, and
11% of cases filed in 2000 terminated with a court decision-including a summary judgment or
trial result-implying that the remainder of the cases were settled for each of these case groups).
Kesan and Ball make the point that these resolutions outside of court involve some affirmative
settlements and some resolutions (for example, dismissals for want of prosecution or voluntary
dismissals) that reflect apparent choices of the parties, but that cannot be confirmed to be
associated with joint agreement on settlement or case resolution terms. See id. at 272.
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significant differences in case resolution patterns. The relevant
numbers of resolved cases in these years are as follows 2 63 :
CASE RESOLUTION BREAKDOWNS BY YEAR
Year Resolved Without Cases with Total
Adjudication Court Result
1995 1131 210 1341
1997 1496 225 1721
2000 1741 224 1965
The chi-squared figure for the changes in the breakdowns of
these cases over the three years studied is 12.7 with two degrees of
freedom, which indicates a probability of only 0.002 that this
observed set of increasing fractions of cases resolved out-of-court
over time occurred through random chance. Since this probability is
less than the 0.01 level generally used for statistical significance, the
chi-square test indicates a statistically significant difference in the
fraction of patent cases resolved through settlements and other out-
of-court resolutions over the three years examined in Kesan and
Ball's study.
Using additional records on case resolutions that identified case
settlements with more particularity, Kesan and Ball tabulated the
fraction of patent cases filed in 1995, 1997, and 2000 that
definitively resulted in case settlements or probable settlements. 264
Using this more stringent analysis, the percentages of patent cases
that Kesan and Ball measured as involving settlements or probable
settlements for 1995, 1997, and 2000 were 65%, 66%, and 68%
263. See id. at 273-74 tbls.4-6.
264. Id. This more detailed analysis of patent case settlements classified a case resolution as
involving a settlement if a case was either coded as settled in the database on case resolutions
maintained by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts or the case docket for the
case indicated a case settlement with no prior adjudication of the case deciding liability on the
merits. Id. at 269. For purposes of this analysis, Kesan and Ball treated settlements and probable
settlements as involving identified settlements, consent judgments, stipulated dismissals, agreed
dismissals, and voluntary dismissals following an answered complaint. Id. at 268-69. For
simplicity, this Article refers to these case resolutions as settlements.
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respectively. 265 Their figures for these settled cases in comparison
with those resolved through adjudications and court results
(including both summary judgments and trials) were as follows 266.
PATENT CASE RESOLUTIONS BY YEAR
Cases Resolved Cases with
with Settlements Court Result
1995 889 210 1099
1997 1141 225 1366
2000 1340 224 1564
The chi-squared figure for these results is 10.8 with two degrees
of freedom, indicating a probability of 0.004 that this observed
breakdown of changes in cases resolved through settlements and
court results occurred through random chance. Since this probability
is less than 0.01, Kesan and Ball's results in their more stringent
analysis also show a statistically significant difference in the fraction
of cases resolved through settlements over the three years of patent
cases they studied.
These results from Kesan and Ball's study, while not focused on
claim construction standards and results per se, provide some
evidence that patent standards in general are providing greater clarity
and more certain analytical frameworks for patent disputants over
time. Determining whether or not this is the case would, of course,
require a study with greater controls for case complexity and case
content over the years studied. However, assuming as appears
reasonable, that the cases entering the patent litigation system
through case filings in one year have a similar spectrum of case types
and uncertainties to those entering in the next year, changes in
settlement frequencies seem less likely to result from changes in the
265. Id. at 273-74 tbls.4-6. The differences in percentages between these and the percentages
for all out-of-court case resolutions involved cases that were resolved through a variety of what
Kesan and Ball term "non-merit dispositions," including such resolutions as dismissals without
prejudice, dismissals for lack of jurisdiction, dismissals for want of case prosecution, default
judgments, and voluntary dismissals in cases where the complaints were unanswered. Id.
266. Id.
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uncertainties of the case facts and more likely to be responsive to
changes in the legal standards and frameworks that produce varying
degrees of material uncertainties in projected case outcomes when
litigants (or more realistically, their attorneys) apply the law to the
case facts and estimate likely case results. Assuming that the factual
complexities and associated valuation uncertainties of all patent
cases filed in a given year are relatively constant over time, the
increased percentages of case settlements observed over time suggest
that litigants are being more and more successful in determining
clear estimates of probable case results (or at least estimates of case
results that are consistently seen across the litigants) and in
formulating mutually agreeable settlements accordingly.
This clarifying effect on settlements and other privately
conducted analyses of patent infringement should be the proper
measure of merit of patent standards, not only for its desirable
impacts on patent litigation, but also for its relationship to clarifying
and improving the predictive quality of forward-looking patent
infringement analyses by counsel seeking to aid clients in avoiding
patent infringement liability regarding future actions. Such a
preventive focus of patent practice has great potential in avoiding
inefficient and costly commitments of business resources to projects
that are interrupted by patent enforcement injunctions or that are
completed only under patent licenses with undesirable terms that are
negotiated under the threat of such injunctions and with weak
bargaining power on the part of the licensees.
Whether or not claim construction standards (as opposed to
patent standards more generally) seem to be producing more
certainty in patent analyses and more settlements in recent years will
require a further study of settlement patterns in patent cases
presenting claim construction issues. Indeed, it might be interesting
to complete a comparative study of settlement patterns in cases
presenting claim construction issues versus other types of contested
patent issues to determine whether there has been a greater or lesser
change in the apparent clarity of claim construction standards and
associated settlement rates than in other contested areas. Such a
study would be difficult, of course, because it would necessitate the
characterization of cases as involving particular types of contested
patent issues-claim construction, novelty, infringement, etc.-
based on case filings and early stage case developments since the
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cases of interest would be those that settle and do not produce further
trial records or case results. Such studies might be possible from
careful analyses of case complaints and answers if these were used to
identify the types of issues or disparate positions of the parties at the
outset of litigation. However, the tendency of parties to overstate
their differences at early stages to preserve issues for later
development may make this a poor source of early stage case
characterizations.
Despite the difficulty of such studies, these sorts of analyses
focusing on case settlements and other types of voluntarily reached
dispositions of patent disputes (such as targeted infringers' entry into
voluntary licenses before the filing of threatened patent infringement
suits) seem necessary if we are to have meaningful evaluations of the
practical clarity of the Federal Circuit's claim construction standards
and other patent standards more generally. Federal Circuit appeals
are simply a small fraction of patent cases that differ from the bulk of
patent cases for the reasons described in this Article. The rates at
which they are resolved just do not say much about how the patent
system is working in the resolution of the great bulk of patent
disputes. The bulk of disputes are resolved before case filing or
pretrial after case filing. 267 There is some evidence that patent
standards are producing better results in these areas, and no evidence
in Federal Circuit reversal rates that would indicate the opposite (at
least at a level that would justify major changes). 268 Rather, our
failure to recognize that Federal Circuit claim construction reversal
rates may measure no more than the continuing accuracy of litigation
counsel in filtering and selecting high uncertainty cases for Federal
Circuit appeals, risks distracting us with irrelevant findings and
focusing a great deal of undue concern and attempted reforms on a
claim construction system that is apparently working well through
settlement processes.
267. See Kesan & Ball, supra note 95, at 273-74 tbls.4-6 (demonstrating that there are
significantly more settlements and probable settlements than non-merit dispositions and rulings
and verdicts at the district court level).
268. See id. (providing some evidence that patent standards afford clarity to Federal Circuit
case outcomes).
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VII. CONCLUSION
Excessive concern about Federal Circuit claim construction
reversal rates is misplaced because such rates are largely
unchangeable and not indicative of patent system problems beyond
the few cases to which they apply. They are largely unchangeable
because the case selection processes described in this Article will
always shift the nature of cases brought to the Federal Circuit to
ensure a high degree of uncertainty in claim construction issues and a
high reversal rate accordingly. These rates are not of concern as they
apply to a very small fraction of outlier cases. Recent studies have
shown that only about 14% or less of all filed patent cases result in
district court adjudications, meaning that Federal Circuit analyses
have a direct influence on no more than 14% of filed patent cases. 269
These few cases leading to Federal Circuit results are abnormal
outliers in the patent system-chosen for their continuing
uncertainties of material issues despite the clarifying effects for the
litigants of trial preparation and trial processes. 270 Given the small
fraction of patent cases involved and the abnormal characteristics of
those cases, reversal rates in cases raising claim construction issues
are not fairly indicative of the impact of Federal Circuit guidance on
the resolution of patent analyses and patent disputes generally.
Indeed, there are reasons to believe-due to the growing fraction
of patent cases resolved through settlements-that present patent
standards are producing consistent and shared views of patent scope
and case value in the analyses of opposing litigants. This capability
of producing clarity in private analyses-both case-resolving
analyses leading to settlements and forward-looking analyses of
counsel giving preventive advice about the scope of patents and
potential patent infringement-should be the focus of our
assessments of the adequacy of claim construction standards and
other patent law standards. These impacts on settlement processes
and preventive advice are highly important, but have little to do with
Federal Circuit reversal rates.
Hence, the correct answer to the question posed by this Article
about whether present claim construction reversal rates of the
Federal Circuit are too high, is that these rates are substantial, but of
269. See explanation provided supra note 146.
270. See supra Part IV.B.
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little meaning regarding patent system quality and are probably
distractions from more important concerns over the clarity of patent
system standards in the eyes of litigation counsel and patent counsel,
who are responsible for most practically important assessments of
patent scope and meaning. When we perseverate over Federal Circuit
reversal rates, we have already lost sight of the proper concern of
patent enforcement clarity-the ability of private parties in litigation
or otherwise-to assess the scope of infringing and noninfringing
activities and to make litigation and conduct decisions accordingly.
The impact of patent standards in clarifying the ways parties analyze
potential patent infringement as inputs to these decisions is
substantial, but has little to do with the resolution of a few high-
uncertainty cases that survive litigation to be resolved by the Federal
Circuit. The pronouncements of the Federal Circuit are important
insofar as they provide guidance for patent analyses in future
situations, but the outcomes of the very few unusual cases the
Federal Circuit resolves and the reversal rates that these resolutions
produce are of little moment. Excessive attention to these rates
distracts us from greater attention to the impacts of Federal Circuit
standards on extrajudicial case resolutions and from acquiring greater
reassurance from some preliminary evidence regarding the resolution
of cases in these private patent analyses that suggests current claim
construction standards are doing just fine.
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